When considering the primary role of journalists as defined by art. 7 of the Journalists' Deontological Code elaborated by the Romanian Press Club - "The journalist has the civic responsibility to act for the establishment of justice and social justice" - The Lumea Justitiei editorial office submitted on Wednesday, January 30th, 2019, to the central structure of TOCID (DIICOT), a complaint against the European dignitaries and officials responsible for the CVM Report of November 13th, 2018 - (see the facsimile).

---

For years, Lumea Justitiei’s journalists - as well as many opinion leaders, dignitaries and even institutions of the judiciary system - have criticized the falsity of the CVM Reports on the State of Justice, that have continually encouraged the institutions of force, ignoring the role of the courts. In fact, the European Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which should have been closed for a long time, has the severe blame for the development and tolerance of the mafia state in our country, through protocols between the services - prosecutors - courts, Reports that have closed their eyes systematically to terrible abuses, and deprived of any respect for European values have sounded the praises of force institutions, headed by NAD.

We believe that the authors of the CVM Reports, especially those issued on 13.11.2018, passed all legal and common sense bounds, and have come to address a political and legal DICTATE to the Romanian authorities, defying the national legislation, the Constitutional Court, the rights of the Parliament as the only legislative power, the Constitution of Romania and especially the Treaty on the European Union.

From the facts presented in the complaint it arises, beyond any doubt, that it was not possible, in relation to the European and national legislation, that via a CVM Report to dictate to Romania what to do or not do in terms of legislation and domestic procedures or to freeze its legislative process.

We do not know what end result will have our judicial approach, but we believe that the time has come for all Romanians to defend their sovereignty and their right not to be discriminated within the European Union, by individuals who have hidden agendas and who assume the right to monitor us on Justice, while hiding all abuses, and even more so encouraging them. Romania cannot be at the mercy of a "mafia state" created during the Traian Basescu regime and acknowledged as such by him, via which, armed with the criminal cases, and via secret protocols between prosecutors - services - courts and other institutions of force, eliminated all Romanian elites.

We publish below the complaint filed with TOCID in terms of organized crime group set up, abuse of office, forgery, communication of false information, etc.

Mister Chief Prosecutor,

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

Against the perpetrators:

1. FRANS TIMMERMANS, First Vice-President of the European Commission and European commissioner for Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights...;

2. VERA JOUROVA, EU Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, for...;

3. ANGELA CRISTEA, Head of the European Commission Representation in Romania, for...;

4. AUGUSTIN LAZAR, General Prosecutor of Romania, for... The criminal investigation body will particularly clarify the aspects described in Chapter II. 3. (6.6.) herein;

5. The perpetrators from the CVM Report drafting team, to be identified, as the CVM Report is not signed, the participation is to be determined by the criminal investigation body, for...

The acts were committed by the adoption of the "Report of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the progress made by Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism" (CVM Report) issued on 13.11.2018 with the breach of the job duties prescribed by the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the applicable legislation by falsifying realities in the Romanian justice area by communicating false information about the Romanian State and by initiating, establishing, adhering and supporting, in any form, an organized criminal group. The actions of the perpetrators are associated with serious political police action by the state's repressive institutions in violation of the Constitution and the rule of law - described in the Complaint - seriously harming the interests of the Romanian State and jeopardizing the national security.

* * *

I. GOVERNING LAW

1.1. According to Art. 1 (5) of the Constitution: ”In Romania, the observance of the Constitution, of its supremacy and of its laws is mandatory.”

According to Art. 10 of the Criminal code: „(1) Romanian criminal law applies to offenses committed outside Romanian territory by a foreign citizen or a stateless person against the Romanian State, against a Romanian citizen or against a Romanian legal entity.”

The perpetrators, Dutch and Czech citizens are European Commission officials and have the status of active subjects of incriminating rules, the passive subject of the crimes being the Romanian State. Romanian criminal law is applicable.

1.2. The perpetrators have the “public servant” status, as per Art. 175 (1), b and (2) of the Criminal Code “exercising a function of public dignity or a public office irrespective of its nature”, as well as „a public-interest service, which they have been vested with by the public authorities or who shall be subject to the latter’s control or supervision with respect to carrying out such public service.” 

In their capacities as First Vice-President of the European Commission and European Commissioner for Better Regulation, Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship; Head of the European Commission Representation in Romania; members of the drafting team - the perpetrators perform functions of public dignity and public functions, exercising a service of public interest - within the meaning of the criminal law - in relation to the rights and obligations of the Romanian state, a Member State of the European Union.

1.3. Art. 297 of the Criminal Code is a protection norm of „the social relations whose normal formation, unfolding and development would not be possible without ensuring the proper functioning of the public authorities’, public institutions’ (...) activities, of the public interest legal persons or any other legal persons against the abuse of civil servants or of other persons exercising an obligation within a legal person and, on the other hand, of the social relations regarding the protection of the legitimate rights or interests of a natural or a legal person, as well as the equal rights, with no discrimination of natural persons.” The New Explained Criminal Code, Vol. II, V. Dobrinoiu, M. A. Hotca, M. Gorunescu, M. Dobrinoiu, I. Pascu, I. Chis, C. Paun, N. Neagu, M. C. Sinescu).

Through their actions and inactions, the perpetrators abused in the exercise of their service duties in violation of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the Romanian Constitution and the legislation on the organization and functioning of the Romanian State, in order to harm the interests of the Romanian State.

1.4. Art. 321 of the Criminal Code protects ”the social relations based on the public trust granted to the authenticity and veracity of official documents or in the reality and authenticity of the official documents.” (NCC Explained, Vol II, pg. 696), ”the act being detrimental to the social relations regarding the public trust that an official document should inspire” (NCC Explained, Vol II, pg. 702).

The CVM Report was drafted by altering facts or circumstances, by failing to insert data and essential circumstances directly related to the objectives of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), and by use of reality and truth distorting criminal techniques about the Romanian justice state, for using the Report against the interests of the Romanian State.

1.5. Art. 404 of the Criminal Code protects ”the social relations regarding the right and obligation of the Romanian State to have ensured the data and information, as well as the documents in the correctness of their transmission and communication, for the stability and correctness of the State’s relation with citizens, international bodies, in a full national security framework.” (NCC Explained, Vol. II, previously quoted).

Through their actions and inactions, while performing their job responsibilities, the perpetrators produced and communicated unrealistic data and information about the Romanian State, and the recommendations - allegedly binding - made on the basis of these falsified data and information, were also fraudulently formulated, by counterfeiting and against the realities that govern the functioning of the Romanian State, being communicated on the domestic and international public scene. Through these actions and inactions, we consider that the national security of Romania has been affected.

1.6. Art. 367 of the Criminal Code protects ”the social relations regarding social cohabitation, the public order and peace severely affected by the creation of criminal associations. If the organized criminal group implements its criminal agenda, it appears as a secondary legal object that consists in the social relations that constitute the legal object of the crimes that constitutes the purpose of the association.

(NCC Explained, Vol. II, previously quoted). Through their actions and inactions, while performing their job responsibilities, the perpetrators created a criminal group based on subjective cooperative and cohesion in order to produce the unique illicit result (the CVM Report) in the forms of "initiation, establishment, accession and support, in any form".

1.7. The Treaty on the European Union provides for the area of competences of the Union’s institutions and the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism established by the Commission’s Decision of December 13th, 2006 provides for the areas in which the Commission is able to carry out its work as well as the nature of the measures that can be taken. The CVM Report of 13.11.2018 flagrantly violates the two legal acts, both in terms of competences and of the nature of the measures requested to the Romanian State.

1.8. The laws governing the role and competences of the Romanian Parliament, the Romanian Government, the Constitutional Court of Romania, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the institution of the Justice Minister, the institution of the Romanian President in the act of law-making and law enforcement, as well as the Constitutional Court Decisions on the appointment and revocation of senior prosecutors. Other laws that will be included in the Complaint.

* * *

II. IN FACT,

On November 13th, 2018, the perpetrators, in accordance with their job obligations, published the "Report of the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the progress made by Romania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism" (CVM Report).

The Report is structured into 4 segments: 1. Introduction; 2. General Situation; 3. Assessment of progress on the fulfilment of the recommendations set out in the January 2017 Report (comprising 4 sub-segments, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4); 4. Conclusions.

We consider that the Report is, in its entirety, a criminal product:

a) by incorrectly presenting the state of the legislation and the legislative actions in Romania;

b) by elusion and/or omission of the real problems the justice system in Romania faced or is facing - among other things the taking over of the justice control by the secret services and their political coordinators or the countless cases made from political interests - against the purpose for which it the CVM was established;

c) via the legislation up for amendment by affecting the citizens' rights and freedoms, and the CVM's aim to justify and maintain the abuse state, against constitutional guarantees and treaties on fundamental rights and freedoms;

d)serious distortions of the prerequisites and solutions regarding the legislative amendments that were adopted by the Romanian State in the constitutional law-making process, with the purpose of blocking and eliminating them;

e) by the explicit partisanship with illegal groups that confiscated the judicial authority, politicizing it and putting it at the service of illegitimate interests, contrary to the principles of the rule of law;

f) by transforming the Report into a pressure and blackmail instrument against Romania, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of the Union, by violating and overstepping the competences of the Union and by defying the principles of the rule of law and the positive rights, the Constitution of Romania, the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

The entire Report was drafted with the direct intention to distort/falsify the realities regarding the organization and functioning of the Romanian State, against the legal truth and the principles of the rule of law, affecting the national security by prejudicing the major interests of the good functioning of the state, as well as compromising the Romanian State in relation to the Union and the other Union Member States.

II.1. PRESENTATION OF THE MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE CVM REPORT ISSUED ON 13.11.2018

We present below the measures included in the Conclusions of the Report, which the perpetrator presents as imperative to the Romanian State:

1. On the Justice laws:

1.1. „Suspend immediately the implementation of the Justice laws and subsequent Emergency Ordinances.”

1.2. „Revise the Justice laws taking fully into account the recommendations under the CVM and issued by the Venice Commission and GRECO.”

2. On Appointments/dismissals within judiciary:

2.1. „Suspend immediately all ongoing appointments and dismissal procedures for senior prosecutors.”

2.2. „Relaunch a process to appoint a Chief prosecutor of the DNA with proven experience in the prosecution of corruption crimes and with a clear mandate for the DNA to continue to conduct professional, independent and non-partisan investigations of corruption.”

2.3. „The Superior Council of Magistracy to appoint immediately an interim team for the management of the Judicial Inspection and within three months to appoint through a competition a new management team in the Inspection.”

2.4. „Respect negative opinions from the Superior Council on appointments or dismissals of prosecutors at managerial posts, until such time as a new legislative framework is in place in accordance with recommendation 1 from January 2017.”

3. On the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes:

3.1. „Freeze the entry into force of the changes to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code.”

3.2. „Reopen the revision of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code taking fully into account the need for compatibility with EU law and international anti-corruption instruments, as well as the recommendations under the CVM and the Venice Commission opinion.”

II. 2 OF THE 8 MEASURES INCLUDED IN THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORT ARE ILLICIT. REASONING:

1.1.All 8 measures are aimed at the law-making process: the immediate suspension of the application of some laws or emergency ordinances, the revision of some laws, the freezing of law-making or enforcing processes of some laws, the reopening of the criminal code and of the criminal procedure code review process, but also the transformation of the advisory opinion of the SCM in the act of appointing or revoking high rank prosecutors with the mandatory opinion, the measure having the meaning of a ”sui generis” law-making act, performed by the Commission itself. It also aims at blocking and resuming some legal procedures for appointing and revoking high rank prosecutors or re-launching the appointment procedure of the NAD Chief Prosecutor, activities that have no legal basis and incite the breaching of the rule of law; blocking and resuming these procedures also represent a violation of the Constitutional Court's Decisions.

1.2. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism is not a source of law neither at the Community legislation level nor at the Romanian or Bulgarian internal legislation level. CVM, as defined by the Commission’s Decision of 13.12.2006, according to points (7) and (8), had the title, in the absence of the "reference objectives", to enforce the safeguard clauses under art. 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession.

The enforcement of the safeguard clauses (ex post) could take place within 3 years of accession: Romania adhering to the EU on January 1st, 2007, these provisions could have been applied to Romania by January 1st, 2010 the latest.

Therefore, the CVM Report of 13.11 .2018 becomes null and void, without being able to produce legal consequences. Since the CVM Report does not refer to safeguard clauses or to the legal grounds for requesting the measures, it results, without doubt, that the perpetrator had the impression that the document was invalid, those measures being nullified. The crime of abuse of office is thus proven.

1.3. In contrast to those stipulated in paragraph 1.2, the perpetrators issued the Report as being mandatory for the Romanian state, the structure and requirements of the official act having this character explicit. The Report is written as imperative, exorbitant, being transformed into a political retaliation mean, the drafting being the one of a political and legislative dictate. Given the functions of the perpetrators, their level of decision within the Commission, their leverage and influence, the Report itself is an act of retaliation against the Romanian State, made with means and for criminal purposes, by breaching the job duties and using the Commission in an abusive manner, against art. (4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

1.4. According to art. 12 of the TEU (consolidated version), the national Parliaments do not fall under the authority and control of the Union’s institutions. Moreover, the CVM cannot hold such title.

Art. 12 of the TEU states the following: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union: (a) through being informed by the institutions of the Union and having draft legislative acts of the Union forwarded to them in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union; (b) by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; (c) by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union policies in that area, in accordance with Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and through being involved in the political monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities in accordance with Articles 88 and 85 of that Treaty; (d) by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in accordance with Article 48 of this Treaty; (e) by being notified of applications for accession to the Union, in accordance with Article 49 of this Treaty; (f) by taking part in the inter-Parliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with the European Parliament, in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union”.

The above Article is confirmed by the Decision no. 216/2012 of the Government of Romania on accelerating the implementation of the CVM objectives: the CVM Commission does not include the Parliament and the Constitutional Court, institutions that do not fall under the authority of the European Commission or of the other Union institutions. The CVM Commission /static the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Public Finance, the Ministry of European Affairs, the Superior Council of Magistrates, the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the National Anticorruption Directorate, the National Integrity Agency. On the other hand, the European Commission's Decision of December 13th, 2006 establishing the CVM was not been ratified by the Romanian Parliament.

Therefore, the EC and CVM do not have authority over the Parliament, and all imperative legislative amendment measures are unnecessary. The measures included in the Report of 13.11.2018 concern legislative amendments and are imperative, a violation by the perpetrators of the TEU, which is the offense of abuse of office.

1.7. The measures are in conflict with the Romanian Constitution, the appointments and revocations of high rank prosecutors, as well as the role of the Minister of Justice and of the President of Romania, as subject to Constitutional Court Decisions, constitute a new and flagrant violation of the TEU: the Constitutional Court's activity and the constitutional regulatory area do not fall within the scope of the Union's Treaty. (The Romanian Constitution is in line with the European standards, being endorsed by the Venice Commission prior to its adoption). Following the abusive actions of the perpetrators, the Constitutional Court ended its relations with the European Commission on the CVM in its March 18th, 2018 communiqué following the RCC plenary decision of March 18th:

"Starting from the role, place and attributions of the Constitutional Court within the rule of law, which obliges it to have a neutral position in the relations between the public authorities and imposes an obligation to reserve on the expression of views which are subject to public debates, with possible political connotations, the Plenum of the Court has expressed its wish not to be involved in the European Commission Delegations' program in the context of CVM. Moreover, the Constitutional Court is not targeted with the issues/objectives pursued by the CVM.”

The CVM Report, in its entire content, defies the independence of the Constitutional Court, contesting its role as the "guarantor of the Constitution’s supremacy" (Art. 142 paragraph 1 of the Constitution) through the criminal means defined by the above-mentioned incrimination rules.

1.8. The measures in the Report ignore the fact that Romania has joined ever since 1993 the European Convention on Human Rights, which is part of the domestic law. Therefore, all criminal legislation including the one regarding the procedural rights and obligations of the State and the other parties is carried out in accordance with the Convention, under the control of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the decisions of the European Court are mandatory. The European Convention on Human Rights is, at the same time, a treaty to which the European Union has joined, according to art. Article 6 (2) of the Treaty: "The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The competences of the Union, as defined in the Treaties, are not altered by this accession. (3) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, constitute general principles of Union legislation. ”As consequence, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code must comply with the Convention's standards, and the Union has to comply with these standards. The codes in force were adopted by assuming the Government’s responsibility or by the emergency ordinance in the past and were declared largely unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court following the subsequent constitutional review, also by taking into account the European Convention and European Court’s Decisions. Unlike the codes in force, the codes pending enforcement followed the joint legislative process, with debates in the Parliament, taking into consideration multiple proposals of the Superior Council of Magistracy and the magistrates' associations, being also subject to control prior to the entry into force of the Constitutional Court.

In a clear abusive way, the CVM Report supports the old codes, seeking to block pending ones, the latter aiming to modify the unchanged texts declared unconstitutional. Systematically, the CVM sides with the abuses and the largely unconstitutional old codes, that do not respect the rights and freedoms of citizens, defend the countless abuses of the prosecutors it unconditionally supports, the manufactured cases, the evidence obtained through blackmail and threats, ignore the thousands of cases open on the judges by prosecutors as blackmail means, supports the politically ordered cases. The action of the perpetrators against the criminal law-making act, which is the exclusive attribute of the Member States and not of the Commission, based on the principle of subsidiarity, is at the same time against the European Convention on Human Rights and the Court of Justice in Strasbourg.

The perpetrators, in exercising of their office duties, used the CVM on the one hand to establish in Romania a police state, against the rule of law, and on the other hand, to maintain the police state represented by persons whose abusive behaviour was noticed by the Constitutional Court.

1.9. The measures urgently require Romania material legislative acts on the suspension, amendment, annulment or adoption of laws governing the "essential functions of the State" (Article 4 (2) TEU), even denying the role and right of the Romanian State of law-making and, this being challenged the statehood attribute itself. Consequently, the CVM Report violates and exceeds the competences assigned to the Union, being a criminal offense.

1.10. Art. 69 of the Constitution, according to which: "(1) In exercising their mandate, deputies and senators are in the service of the people. (2) Any mandatory mandate is null“ is directly breached. With the imperative demands of amending the laws and the Constitution, the Report violates the respective text, transforming the mandate of deputies and senators into an imperative one. These requests violate and exceed the TEU framework, the competences assigned by the treaty to the Union, according to art. 3 (6), art. 4 (1), (2), (3), art. 5 (1), (2) of the Treaty.

II. 3. THE DANGER REPRESENTED BY THE MEASURES IN THE REPORT REGARDING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ROMANIAN STATE AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY; IMPOSIBILE AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS

The measures presented in paragraph 4 of the Report - Conclusions - are unacceptable not only due to the lack of MCV's competence to make such recommendations. The measures are also unacceptable due to their requirements, which fall into the area of "impossible, illicit and immoral conditions". This general principle of law is reflected in art. 6 (1) of the Law no. 24/2000 republished on the legislative technique: "The draft normative act must establish necessary, sufficient and possible rules that lead to as much stability and legislative efficiency as possible." Also, art. 1402 of the New Civil Code stipulates the following: "The impossible condition that is contrary to the law or to the good morals is considered unwritten, and if it is the cause of the contract itself, it entails its absolute nullity", the text being an establishment of the general principle of law.

The same principle is reflected in art. 53 (2) of the Constitution regarding the restriction of the exercise of certain rights or freedoms, which applies a fortiori in this case: "The restriction may be imposed only if it is necessary in a democratic society. The measure must be proportionate to the situation that caused it, to be applied in a non-discriminatory manner and without prejudice to the existence of the right or the freedom."

We present below the reasons why the measures are impossible, illicit and immoral, proof of the abusive actions of the perpetrator, within the meaning of art. 297 of the Criminal Code.

1.1 "Suspend immediately the implementation of the Justice laws and subsequent Emergency Ordinances".

1.1.1. The measure is irrational, impossible to apply, the Report ultimately asking ("immediate suspension") to block the enforcement of the three laws of justice in their entirety. This is Law 303/2004, amended and supplemented by Law 242/2018, on the status of judges and prosecutors, which came into force on October 18th, 2018; Law 304/2004, amended and supplemented by Law 207/2018, in force since July 23rd, 2018, on judicial organization; Law 317/2004, amended and supplemented by Law 234/2018, on the organization and functioning of the Superior Council of Magistracy, that entered into force on October 11th, 2018. There is no constitutional or legal institution that abolishes a law in force in its entirety "immediately", through an exorbitant action, without first adopting other legislation in that area, that abrogates the first, based on the legal and constitutional established law-making procedures. This is not about an error, because the measure speaks of the "immediate suspension of implementation", inducing the idea that it could return to the old laws, which is again impossible, those laws being repealed from the enforcement moment of the new ones, without the legal possibility of returning to the old ones: Law 24/2000 specifically regulates this situation. The violation of Law 24/2000 and the Constitution by the perpetrators is thus flagrant.

1.1.2. The application of the measure is absurd, the immediate and direct consequences of the "suspension" –leading to situation of legal inefficiency - representing, from a logical legal perspective, the disappearance of the entire judiciary system and, implicitly, the statehood in Romania. According to the reductio ad absurdum argument, the measure would have the following consequences: the courts, including the High Court, all prosecutors and the entire Public Ministry, Superior Council of Magistracy would disappear as institutions. The control of legality would also be suspended, all other institutions being blocked (suspended): the Government, the Ministries, the local public administration, the Constitutional Court, etc., that operate correlated with the judicial system, implicitly the servants of the other state powers, legislative and executive. Such a measure violates and oversteps the competences of the Union, which does not have the attribute of suspending the status of its members. The emergence of such a requirement in an official act of the European Union represents the compromise of its institutions. This requirement proves Political Dictate character of the Report.

2. „Revise the Justice laws taking fully into account the recommendations under the CVM and issued by the Venice Commission and GRECO.”

2.1. The measure appears to be accessory to the first measure on the "immediate suspension" of the Justice laws. The first measure is null and void, the second, accessory, is also null and void.

2.2. The Report is severely misleading because, in the legislative process on Justice laws, the recommendations of the Venice Commission and GRECO, as well as the CVM's up-to-date recommendations, have been considered, to the extent that the legislative institutions considered it necessary. The supposition that these bodies should replace the Romanian Parliament entirely, transform it into a decoration institution, is a criminal act of the CVM, that represents an official act of the Commission. The recommendation instrument, as it is defined, can only be used in cooperative relations, especially as there is no community acquis in state operating and criminal policy areas.

2.3. These laws passed the filter of the Constitutional Court, an institution not under the authority of the Commission and CVM, and being adopted by Parliament, that does not fall either under the authority of the Commission and the CVM.

3. „Suspend immediately all ongoing appointments and dismissal procedures for senior prosecutors.”

3.1. Following the disclosures that shook the entire national public opinion about the enormous abuses committed by the National Anticorruption Directorate, systematic actions of evidence forgery, witness blackmailing, case manufacturing through false criminal charges ordered by prosecutors, illegal use of undercover witnesses, in order to conceal the truth, also practices in which denouncers were used in the same case as witnesses and also undercover witnesses, etc. were proven, a real modus operandi for prosecution through falsified evidence of senior dignitaries and politicians for the purpose of their removal from public scene, the destruction of some state institutions (such as the secret service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) by indicting its entire leadership without evidences –so that later, after removing inconvenient persons from office, to drop all the criminal prosecution, etc. This generalized institutional corruption system was also proven to have been constituted by the adoption of Secret Protocols concluded by all the institutions of the judiciary with the Romanian Intelligence Service: the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Public Ministry, the National Anticorruption Directorate, the Superior Council of the Magistrates, the Judicial Inspection, Protocols by which the RIS controlled the entire criminal investigation and the activity of all these institutions as a whole.

3.2. Prime Ministers of Romania, ministers, deputies, senators, judges and prosecutors, a judge of the Constitutional Court, a general prosecutor of Romania, heads of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ secret service, hundreds of members of political parties in their functions as mayors, councillors, county councillors, but also businessmen, media trust owners were victims. After their trial in the courts or even in the course of the criminal investigation, they were declared innocent, but after the objective of their removal from office was reached. This political police system was organized and operated under the highest authority of the Romanian State and aimed at eliminating uncomfortable and uncompliant persons, in order to establish a forceful regime in Romania.

3.3. The same political police system, whose exorbitant instrument were the criminal cases abusively handled by prosecutors, tried to block the activity and to destructure the Government and the Parliament of Romania, with the direct intention of bringing under the control of prosecutors and secret services the entire legislative process: in several situations the NAD prosecutors have taken concrete steps to prosecute dignitaries in relation to the legislative process, with the same modus operandi of manufacturing criminal cases. These political police attempts were denounced by the Decision no. 68 of the Constitutional Court issued on February 27th, 2017: "The Public Ministry, as part of the judicial authority, was considered competent to verify the opportunity, the observance of the legislative procedure and, implicitly, the legality of adopting the Government's Emergency Ordinance. Such conduct equals to a serious violation of the principle of the separation of powers, guaranteed by art. 1 par. (4) of the Constitution, because the Public Ministry not only exceeds the attributions provided by the Constitution and the law, but also assumes attributions belonging to the legislative power or to the Constitutional Court. (...) The Public Ministry - The Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice - The National Anticorruption Directorate has assumed the competence to carry out a criminal investigation in an area that exceeds the legal framework that may lead to an institutional blockage from the perspective of the constitutional provisions devoted to the separation and balance of state powers. (...) the action of the Public Ministry creates pressure on the members of the Government, which affects the proper functioning of this authority from the law-making perspective, with the consequence of the deterring/intimidating of the delegated legislator to exercise its constitutional attributions. The launch of a large criminal investigation, which resulted in raids on the Ministry of Justice, the seizure documents, the hearing of a large number of public servants, state secretaries and ministers led to a state of tension, of psychological pressure even during the carrying out of legislative procedures, creating the prerequisites of a law-making activity blockage. Thus, in the face of fear triggered by the criminal investigation and the formulation of future accusations that may determine the incidence of criminal liability, the Government is blocked in its legislative activity. The circumstance created voids the contents of the constitutional guarantee regarding the immunity inherent in the decision-making act, of which the members of the Government benefit, a guarantee aimed precisely at protecting the mandate against possible pressures or abuses committed against the person in the minister position, the immunity ensuring his/her independence, freedom and security in exercising his/her rights and obligations provided by the Constitution and the law. Through its conduct, the Public Ministry - the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice - the National Anticorruption Directorate has acted ultra vires, has assumed a competence that it does not possess - the control of the manner in which a normative act is adopted in terms of its legality and opportunity, which affected the proper functioning of an authority."(Paragraphs 120-121)

3.4. A new Decision of the Constitutional Court, Decision 611 of October 3rd, 2017, was needed to determine a new constitutional conflict, this time between the Romanian Parliament and the Public Ministry - through the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the National Direction Anticorruption - by which the Court finds "the creation of a blockage in the activity of the special investigation commission (aspect also mentioned in the elaborated partial Report), blockage that determined the Parliament of Romania to adopt a decision to extend the period of the commission's activity by 60 days for continuing the legal actions to reach the objectives for the purposes the Parliamentary investigation was started.” The blockage was created by the repeated and explicit refusal of the then Chief Prosecutor, Laura Codruta Kovesi, to appear before the Parliamentary investigative commission, in violation of the commission's legal attributions. The Court decided in this context that "when the person invited to participate in the meetings of the investigative commission is a person representing, by virtue of his/her management function, a public authority not under Parliamentary control - the Public Ministry - The Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, in the application of the principle of loyal cooperation between the state institutions/authorities, he/she has the obligation to take part in the commission’s proceedings in all cases and regardless of the subject of the Parliamentary inquiry. Through his/her conduct, the chief prosecutor of the National Anti-corruption Directorate not only avoids a priori any loyal cooperation with the authority exercising the sovereignty of the people - the Romanian Parliament, but refuses to participate in the clarification of some aspects related to an event of public interest (participation in the evening of December 6th, 2009, the date when the national elections for the President of Romania took place, together with other persons holding public functions - the Director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the deputy director of the Romanian Intelligence Service and senators, in the home of Senator Gabriel Oprea) if it proved real, would have a major negative impact on the social, political and legal scenes, thus preserving a state of uncertainty about the trustworthiness of the investigated events.

On the other hand, through his/her activity and attitude, the person who holds a leading position in a public authority of the state must ensure the prestige of the exerted position, which imposes a legal, social and moral conduct in accordance with the rank of public dignity, with the degree of representation and citizens' trust in state authority. The exercise of public leading positions, as is the case in any public function in the state, cannot be limited to the exercise of the rights, duties and obligations imposed by the mandate held, but a priori implies the loyalty to all values ​​and principles provided by the Constitution and respect for the other public authorities with which they have relations of collaboration. From this context results the main obligation of any representative of public authorities to present themselves and offer useful and conclusive documents or information in front of the Parliamentary inquiry committees in order to clarify certain factual circumstances that lead to finding the truth in a matter of public interest."

Even after this RCC decision, the Chief Prosecutor Laura Codruta Kovesi refused to appear before the Parliament, with the implicit support of Attorney General Augustin Lazar, thus defying the Parliament, the institution that represents the Romanian people and exercises the national sovereignty. The CVM's support for Laura Codruta Kovesi was implicit and explicit.

3.5. The third decision of the Constitutional Court, Decision 757 of November 23rd, 2017, expressly limited the area of activity of NAD, led by Laura Codruta Kovesi, expressly stipulating: "With regard to the opportunity of issuing an individual administrative act, the prosecutor's office is not competent in starting the prosecution "and" there is no control mechanism of the opportunity of issuing the administrative act. Therefore, if the law allows the performing of a certain administrative operation, in the sense that it leaves it in the administrative body’s margin of appreciation, the censorship of the opportunity of appreciating the latter cannot be questioned.” This was the third decision of the Constitutional Court, which found violations of the supreme law by the NAD under the direction and authorization of the head of the institution, regarding two Government decisions, the prosecutors assessing their opportunity.

3.6. In the context of those mentioned above, at 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. and 3.4, pursuant to Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution, which confers authority to the Minister of Justice on the activity of prosecutors to be carried out "in accordance with the principles of legality, impartiality and hierarchical control", the Minister of Justice initiated the procedure for the dismissal of the NAD Chief Prosecutor, Laura Codruta Kovesi. That document contains several findings of the chief prosecutor's activity. The Romanian Attorney General, Augustin Lazar aggressively opposed the revocation, assuming and becoming an accomplice of the NAD’s Chief Prosecutor, striving to paralyze the procedure against the obvious and particularly grave abuses that could jeopardize the entire rule of law, but also the rights and freedoms of citizens.

3.7. By the Decision no. 358 of the Constitutional Court issued on May 30th, 2018 the procedure for the appointment/revocation of senior prosecutors was clarified. Measure 3 of CVM Conclusions of 13.11.2018 completely ignored this Decision; although being a decision of the Constitutional Court, this decision is opposable to the European Commission, which has no scope of challenging the Constitution of Romania - an expression of the people’s sovereignty - whose supremacy is a fundamental principle of democracy. In this context, measure 3 from the Conclusions of the CVM Report is from inception null and void. Given that if Decision no. 358/2008 of the Court would have been considered, measure 3 would no longer be possible, indicating the direct criminal intention of the perpetrators, not to observe and to challenge the "generally binding" CCR decision.

3.8. The Court Decision 358/2018 states that the Minister of Justice "has a central role" (paragraph 103 of the Decision) in the process of appointing/revoking senior prosecutors through the "authority" conferred to it by art. 132 (1) of the Constitution. In the appointment procedure, "the minister has a wide margin of appreciation, since the limitations imposed by the law, in the form of the necessary conditions to be objectively met by the prosecutor to be appointed in the leading position, are minimal ..." (Paragraph 101 of the Dec.), and in the revocation procedure, “the Minister of Justice has a minimum margin of appreciation, since the limitations imposed by the law are extremely strict, and in these circumstances, the President of Romania can oppose only his/her right to verify the legality of the proposal, and may refuse it only if the proposal does not comply with the law, in which case the procedure ceases." (Paragraph 102 of the Dec.). The decision analyses extensively the entire legal and constitutional framework, raising the respective procedural norms to constitutional status, which go de plano beyond the CVM's powers to request the establishment of other procedures for the appointment/revocation of senior prosecutors.

3.9. On October 24th, 2018, the Minister of Justice initiated the revoking procedure of the General Prosecutor, Augustin Lazar by a comprehensive Evaluation Report. The Minister identified 20 serious reasons, each of them being enough for the revocation, the revocation being though requested, for their entirety:

a) the repeated contesting of the legislative power’s authority (Parliament and Government);

b) the repeated contesting of the Constitutional Court’s authority;

c) the illegality of his appointment as General Prosecutor;

d) the signing of a Protocol with the Romanian Intelligence Service outside the legal framework (the General Prosecutor lying to the public and contesting himself, before the Protocol becomes public, the existence of such protocols);

e) supporting the NAD Chief Prosecutor in his actions - for which the latter has been revoked -;

f) the excess of power regarding the modification of Judicial Inspection Report- the modifications made by the general prosecutor being subsequently abolished by the court;

g) the eminently political discourse, with unprecedented accusations against the state’s institutions;

h) practicing and encouraging behaviours contrary to constitutional and legal obligations, public messages in violation of the discretion obligations imposed on magistrates;

i) abdication from constitutional guarantees such as the respect for the presumption of innocence and human dignity;

j) the contesting of the Constitutional Court’s Decisions, in order to encourage their non-observance by the prosecutors;

k) serious management issues, the widespread use of delegates in leading positions; lowering the efficiency of the Public Ministry’s activity;

l) the public criticism of the judges, as being dissatisfied with their rulings;

m) double measure of and the delays in legal procedures;

n) violation of a General Prosecutor's order in the event inquiry of August 10th, 2018;

o) the violation of the law by signing certain Protocols interfering in both the Parliament’s and Court’s activities and the creation of a "secret" justice incompatible with the right to a fair trial and the principles of the rule of law;

p) concealing the truth related to the Secret Protocols and the high-jacking of the public opinion;

r) behaviour against the deontological code of magistrates.

3.10. The situation described above was brought to the attention of the perpetrators by the Romanian authorities, officially, these attempts being of public notoriety. The perpetrators, defying the serious realities, incompatible with the rule of law, citizens' rights and freedoms, completely ignored all these realities, the actions of the institutions - the Parliament, the Government, the Ministry of Justice, the Legislative Council, the Constitutional Court, the civil society represented by associations of magistrates that participated in the law-making process, with the purpose of drafting and adopting a CVM Report that had misleading role regarding the realities in Romania, compromising the Romanian state through falsified information, and justifying a political Dictate under the threat of the institution the perpetrators represent.

3.11. In fact, the "immediate suspension of all ongoing, appointment and revoking procedure, of senior prosecutors" has the direct purpose of keeping in position the General Prosecutor, Augustin Lazar, one of the representatives of the political police system established in Romania - the signer of an illegal secret protocol between the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice and the RIS, finalized in December 2016 (declared outside the law by the Constitutional Court via its January 16th, 2019 Decision).

This behaviour of the perpetrator was also present through the support of Laura Codruta Kovesi and NAD before, during and after her revocation, despite serious and repeated abuses, of the flagrant violations of the constitutional order and the rule of law, of the patronage of a system that violated the rights and freedoms of citizens, disturbed the state institutions by manufactured cases, such as to disrupt the functioning of the Government, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court for the clear purposes of political police.

3.12. This measure proves without a doubt that the perpetrators Frans Timmermans, Vera Jourova, Angela Cristea and others, have violated their job responsibilities, which obliged them to respect the Romanian Constitution, and that they are in a relation of complicity with the political police system established in Romania, fraudulently using the European Commission, whose functions they have hijacked and trenched upon for the benefit of some group interests.

4. "Relaunch a process to appoint a Chief prosecutor of the NAD with proven experience in the prosecution of corruption crimes and with a clear mandate for the NAD to continue to conduct professional, independent and non-partisan investigations of corruption.”

4.1. The measure is unnecessary because it does not refer to legal issues, but to a particular person, a situation that goes beyond the TEU's regulations: "appointment of a NAD prosecutor with proven experience in the criminal prosecution of corruption offenses."

4.2. From the text of the measure it results that the Report specifically requests that the person who will lead the NAD:

1) to have been exclusively a part of the NAD prosecutors, i.e. Laura Codruta Kovesi’s team, a situation that is contrary to the legislation in force, which lays down objective eligibility criteria (a certain period of service as prosecutor, the lack of disciplinary sanctions, the rating given by the SCM to that person). This limitation that the CVM and the perpetrators want is related to the intention to preserve the abusive and non-transparent work mode promoted by Laura Codruta Kovesi, who was revoked precisely for her abuses;

2) The measure also evokes the "continuity" of the functioning manner of the NAD, in the conditions that the former NAD Chief Prosecutor was revoked precisely for grave abuses, repeated violations of the Constitution, manufactured cases, actions against the legislative power, as we have shown in sub-chapter II. 3. The text directly indicates the complicity of the perpetrators with the old abusive leadership and its support for all its unlawful and unconstitutional actions against the Parliament, the Government, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the Judicial Inspection and the Constitutional Court.

4.3. The measure is a pressure act against the Minister of Justice, the Superior Council of Magistracy and the President of Romania, the institutions involved in the legal procedure of appointing the NAD chief prosecutor, even against the legality of this procedure.

4.4. In fact, also from this measure, corroborated with the other measures, results the interest of the perpetrator in maintaining the status quo of the NAD's political police and, on the other hand, of not creating the conditions for disclosing complications within the old team led by former Chief Prosecutor, who repeatedly and brutally violated the Constitution. This interest on the part of the perpetrators is suspicious and cannot be related to the objectives of the Commission, but only with the interests of the group that they pursue, by using their functions abusively.

5. ”The Superior Council of Magistracy to appoint immediately an interim team for the management of the Judicial Inspection and within three months to appoint through a competition a new management team in the Inspection.”

5.1. Through the official SCM communiqué of 14.11.2018, adopted by the SCM plenum, this institution defined by art. 133 par. 1 of the Constitution as "the guarantor judiciary independence", protested vigorously against the CVM Report of 13.11.2018, exposing its abuses, which it does not assume and conveys that it will not put into action the measures that concern it. The communiqué is one of the evidences that will be considered for the criminal prosecution of the perpetrators, for the offenses covered by the present Notice.

5.2.1. The first accusation brought by the SCM to the CVM Report and implicitly to the perpetrator, refers to an alleged "pressure" of which the Council of the High Court of Cassation and Justice is accused of (point 3.3 of the Report, page 15): "In the content of the Report it is imputed to the Superior Council of Magistracy that it has exerted pressure on the High Court of Cassation and Justice, by failing to renew the mandate of the president of the Criminal Section of this court. Such a finding is unacceptable, since appointment to senior management positions at the High Court of Cassation and Justice is the exclusive prerogative of the Section for Judges and falls within its margin of appreciation. In addition, the Report ignores the objective findings of the Section for Judges, which have substantiated the decision to reject the candidature and have been presented extensively in its content. On the other hand, the fact that the mandate of the president of the Criminal Section has not been renewed cannot in any way influence the judgment in the criminal cases invoked by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Moreover, the judge in question was subsequently delegated in the position of President of the Section, which, by delegation, currently exercises continuing to solve the criminal cases with which he was invested. In addition, the erroneous prerequisites on which the conclusion of the Report is based would mean that in no event would it be possible to appoint another judge, fact that obviously cannot be accepted." The CSM conclusions found the same type of abuse contained in the Report, such as those found in this Notice.

5.2.2. The second accusation brought by the SCM concerns the issue of the Judicial Inspection (point 3.1 of the Report, pages 5, 6): "Concerning the conclusion of the Report regarding the necessity of the immediate appointment by the Superior Council of Magistrates of the Interim Management Team of the Judicial Inspection and the appointment within 3 months, by contest, of a new management of the Judicial Inspection, we specify that at the level of the Council the decisional transparency procedure is in progress, procedure that is preliminary to the adoption of the new Regulation for the appointment of the Chief Inspector of the Judicial Inspection, which impedes on the success of the procedure." The SCM therefore rejects the Report, stating unequivocally that the measure is inappropriate and cannot substitute the internal legislation, the role and the constitutional function of the SCM. The firm opposition of the SCM again indicates the abuse of the Report, the bad faith and the interest of the perpetrators in violating the legal rules of the SCM activity, the abusive exercise of the job responsibilities of the perpetrators.

5.2.3. The third accusation brought by the SCM concerns the false finding of the Report, according to which by Ordinance no. 92/2018 it would have been "strengthened the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice to initiate disciplinary proceedings specifically against prosecutors."

The SCM rightly points out: "In fact, the successive legislative changes in succession operated during 2018 removed the status of owner of the disciplinary action that the minister had previously. This quality was replaced by the mere possibility of the Minister of Justice to notify the Judicial Inspection as any interested person in order to carry out verifications on disciplinary misconduct of the judges and prosecutors.”

The SCM notes once again that the CVM Report was made by misrepresenting the realities of the Romanian judicial system. In fact, the Report's support is directly aimed at attacking the role of the justice minister in the judiciary, a role regulated by the Constitution, law and the multitude of Constitutional Court Decisions, undermining the authority of the minister, which the SCM clearly rejects as false.

5.2.4. Another false accusation found by the SCM in the same Communication refers to the multiple accusations made by the Report that, on the one hand, the SCM would not fulfil its constitutional obligation to defend the independence of the judiciary against the law-making act, and, on the other, the Parliament and the Government would ignore, for political reasons (in the sense of blocking the anti-corruption fight), the SCM proposals. The SCM again defies the CVM Report and the perpetrator, devoiding in the subsidiarity the lack of impartiality and the group interests behind it to undermine the Romanian legislative process: "In the procedures for adopting the Justice laws, the Superior Council of Magistracy had a positive attitude, formulating numerous proposals aimed at improving the legal regulations in the area, many of which are, in fact, well followed by the legislative process. Consistent with the same approach, even if the law does not provide for the approval requirement, the Council assessed the legislative proposals for the criminal and civil codes submitted to it by the legislator and, based on the comments of the courts and prosecutors' offices, formulated a significant number of proposals for the adaptation of the legislation, some of them being followed in the Parliamentary procedure that has been carried out so far." The SCM Communication conveys to the perpetrators that they refuse the Dictate policy, which is not related to the reality.

5.2.5. The SCM disputes the entire Report, the subjective and inappropriate way in which it was drafted, implicitly referring to the other institutions targeted by the perpetrators, their intention to "create a wrong perception" on the functioning of justice in Romania: "in connection with some the aspects included in the Report, in order to ensure a correct information of the public opinion, some factual or appreciation errors must also be signalled in connection with the activity of the Superior Council of Magistracy, so that it creates an erroneous perception regarding this public authority."

5.3. Those presented at this point indicate, without any doubt, on one side that the Report does not reflect the real situation of the Romanian justice state, being realized through abuse of office and the violation of the job requirements.

6. ”Respect negative opinions from the Superior Council on appointments or dismissals of prosecutors at managerial posts, until such time as a new legislative framework is in place in accordance with recommendation 1 from January 2017.”

6.1. The measure equals to the transformation of the CVM Report into a sui-generis legislative act, repealing and amending the legislation in force, which provides that the SCM's opinions are consultative. In concrete, the state institutions should disregard the legal and constitutional framework, but directly by the measure dictated by CVM. The mechanism cannot have a legislative function, which is why, from the outset, this measure is illegal and unacceptable, being a new abuse, a violation of the job responsibilities of the perpetrators.

6.2. The measure has the character of an extraordinary act, of suspending the legislation in force until the moment of a new regulation, the one dictated by the CVM. By this measure, but also by the other imperative measures that have the effect of removing "immediately" and mandatory legislation in force, the art. 126 (5) of the Constitution is thus breached, the Commission considering itself the "extraordinary court", such institutions being forbidden by the Constitution.

6.3. Art. 61 (1) of the Constitution is breached, article that states that the Parliament is "the sole legislator of the country", as well as art. 108 and art. 115 of the Constitution, regarding the legislative delegation of the Government. It also violates Law no. 24/2000 regarding the normative legal technical norms for the elaboration of normative acts, which regulates the entire legislative process involving several institutions of the state, plus the control of the Constitutional Court. To this legal process, the perpetrators oppose a normative valued act, of political dictate, which undermines Romanian statehood.

6.4. In fact, such a measure cancels the role of the Minister of Justice provided by art. 132 (1) of the Constitution, but also the role of the President, the act of appointing and revoking prosecutors in leading positions was transferred to the Superior Council of Magistracy, which has no constitutional "authority" over the activity of prosecutors, who are part of the executive power.

6.5. The measure proves the political partisanship of the perpetrators, as a group of illegitimate interests: in 2009, despite receiving a negative opinion from the SCM, Laura Codruta Kovesi was appointed by the President as General Prosecutor, although the SCM opinion was negative. The change in the position of the Commission proves that the measure is "committed" to supporting people whom the perpetrators want to lead the Romanian prosecutor offices, probably to serve the interests of illegitimate groups, and not a position of principle. The perpetrators have used their functions in violation of their job responsibilities, which is the offense of abuse of office.

6.6. The fact that the perpetrators claim that the opinion of the SCM is compulsory, against the law, regarding Augustin Lazar, also induces a strong suspicion of criminal nature, namely that they knew in advance or even ordered that the opinion of the Prosecutor's Section to be negative at the proposal for the revocation of the Minister of Justice. Thus, the Prosecutor's Section of the SCM had set a deadline for submitting the proposal for the dismissal of the minister on 05.11.2018, unusually, the General Prosecutor Augustin Lazar pretended that he could not be present for personal reasons, so that the Prosecutor's Section postponed the presentation for 19.11.2018. Meanwhile, on 13.11.2018 the CVM Report was published, which imperatively requires that the negative opinion of the SCM be mandatory. Thus, on 19.11.2018, the date of the presentation of the revocation proposal, the MCV Report was public and could be invoked by Augustin Lazar against the Minister of Justice, which would not have been possible if the submission of the revocation proposal had been made on 05.11.2018. As an indication that it is possible to have a criminal understanding between Augustin Lazar and the authors of the Report, in order to illegally block his dismissal, is the public statement of Justice Minister, Tudorel Toader, even during the presentation of the revoking proposal in front of the SCM, that he has information that the negative opinion had already been drafted, before the presentation of the proposal within the SCM.

The following questions arise:

1) Why did the SCM set a deadline for presenting the revocation on 05.11.2018, when the minister's proposal had been submitted to the SCM on 24.10.2018, the period being unusually long?

2) If the General Prosecutor's request for postponement of 05.2018, why did the SCM again give such a long term, for 19.11.2018?

3) Was the CVM Report published on 13.11.2018 a coincidence and was it also a coincidence that it had imperatively requested, against legal regulation, that the negative opinion to be mandatory?

4) What information was held by the Minister of Justice on 19.11.2018, the deadline for submitting the revocation proposal that within the SCM the negative opinion had already been drafted indicating that the SCM members had already taken the decision, before submitting the proposal, in an illegal framework?

5) Why, in all public statements, did the Prosecutor invoke the CVM Report in his defence, ignoring the reasons in the Minister's proposal?

6) Do the numerous references of Augustin Lazar to the CVM Report on the public scene as an argument against the revoking initiative of the Justice Minister reflect his complicity in drafting the Report?

These questions raise a strong suspicion that the CVM Report was a criminal arrangement between the General Prosecutor, the CVM investigators and the CSM Prosecutor Section, against the Minister of Justice, while violating the legal procedure, in order to provide protection to the General Prosecutor. The doubt of the existence of such an agreement is legitimate, not only in response to the above questions, but also in relation to that modus operandi which is current practice in the Romanian state police system, which the perpetrators, the CVM authors support and defend in the entire Report. The Romanian Government has transmitted warnings that there were occult agreements behind the CVM to the Commission countless times, warnings that have been completely ignored. The general situation of CVM's unlawfulness indirectly confirms such a reality, which would expose the European Commission to suspicions of mafia-style practices.

6.7. The measure transcends the competences provided by the Accession Treaty and represents a flagrant violation of the perpetrators' job responsibilities, by breaking the law, and committing offenses provided by art. 297, art. 321, art. 404 and 367 of the Criminal Code.

7. ”Freeze the entry into force of the changes to the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code”

7.1. There is no institution of "freezing" the legislative process in a democratic state, this being equivalent to the suspension of that Member State’s statehood and, secondly, of the sovereignty of the people, which is exercised as uninterrupted statehood state of law. The measure, as an act of immediate application in the perception of the perpetrators, represents the denial of statehood in Romania.

7.2. The criminal policy of the Member States does not fall within the Union's area of responsibility, not being attributable by the Accession Treaty. There is no Community acquis in this area. The freezing of the legislative process in the criminal area - in its entirety, being the two codes that regulate the criminal process in its entirety, represents a direct abolition of the EUT, denial of Romanian statehood. We believe that the offense is thus proven.

7.3. The current Codes were adopted either by assuming Governmental responsibility or by the Government Emergency Ordinance, without any public debate and without the prior control of the Constitutional Court. The perpetrators’ support of those codes, against codes adopted in the ordinary procedure with constitutional control, is non-rational and proves the lack of impartiality, the political partisanship and complicity in political police acts. This act is not the only one leading to such a conclusion, the perpetrators using the Commission in the interest of illegitimate groups.

7.5. The existence of an underground legislative process control group in Romania, both domestically and internationally, is a matter that threatens national security.

8. ”Reopen the revision of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code taking fully into account the need for compatibility with EU law and international anti-corruption instruments, as well as the recommendations under the CVM and the Venice Commission opinion.”

8.1. The measure violates the TEU because the Member States' criminal policy does not fall within the Union's area of regulation, but it is the exclusive right of the Member States. Thus, the measure is unnecessary and represents a violation of the perpetrators' job responsibilities.

8.2. There is, as the perpetrator falsely claims, no "EU right" in criminal matters and no community acquis, a unanimously known and internationally recognized situation. Therefore, the measure is an act of misleading, of unacceptable political pressure, of blackmail on the Romanian state.

8.3. By this measure, the CVM Report directly violates Article 4 of the Accession Treaty: "(1) In accordance with Article 5, any competence which is not attributed to the Union by the Treaties belongs to the Member States. (2) The Union respects the equality of Member States in relation to the Treaties and their national identities, inherent in their fundamental political and constitutional structures, including local and regional autonomy. It respects the essential functions of the state and, in particular, those aimed at ensuring its territorial integrity, maintaining public order and defending national security. In particular, national security remains the exclusive responsibility of each Member State."

8.4. The previously quoted Article 4 has been violated by all eight measures, the Commission directly breaching the principle of equality between Member States, primarily by maintaining the CVM after 2010 - three years after Romania's accession in 2007 – the ex post due date the safeguarding clauses could have been applied. Even if the CVM was not qualified as an instrument in relation to the safeguarding clauses, through the extended application of the accessorium sequitur principalem principle could not exceed three years from accession. We quote from the Treaty that regulated the Commission's competencies: "If there are imminent delays or risks in transposing or implementing the framework decisions and relevant commitments, of cooperation instruments and decisions on mutual recognition in civil matters in a new Member State under Title IV of the Treaty (TEC), the Commission, on its own initiative or at the request of a Member State, may, within the first three years from the entry into force of the Accession Treaty, take the necessary measures and specify their application conditions." By extending without legal basis the CVM beyond 2010, the Commission seriously violates its own treaty, abolishing the principle of equality of Member States, this Report being illegal and unenforceable, without being opposable to the Romanian State. The perpetrator has breached his job responsibilities, limited to the competences of the Union attributed by the TEU.

* * *

III. THE SECRET PROTOCOLS THAT DISTROYED THE JUSTICE AND THE TRUST IN JUSTICE WERE RECOGNITED BY THE REPORT: THE PROOF OF COMPLICITY OF THE PERPETRATORS WITH THE ROMANIAN POLITICAL POLICE ACTIVITIES

1. The discovery by the Parliament of the Secret Protocols between the Romanian Intelligence Service and the Institutions of the Judicial Authority; the significance of the Protocols

1.1. Following the exercise of Parliamentary control over the activities of the secret services, the Control Commission on the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) discovered that, following secret Decisions of the Supreme Council of National Defence (SCND/CSAT) in 2005, Secret Protocols were signed between RIS and the Institutions of Judicial Authority, as follows: the Public Ministry through the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the National Anticorruption Directorate, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the Judicial Inspection and the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

1.2. The activities carried out under the Protocols’ mechanism were aimed at:

1) probation in criminal cases with the involvement of information officers,

2) information about investigated persons brought by the RIS to the knowledge of the judges or prosecutors, the lawyer being forbidden to take note of;

3) Reporting by magistrates of the evolutions and stages of the criminal cases to the information officers;

4) creation of joint teams between magistrates and information officers in relation to the investigation of criminal cases;

5) direct and unlimited contact between the information officers and the judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, including for the purpose of discussing the manner of interpreting the evidence and the solutions to be pronounced;

6) collaboration with the secret services in order to achieve the constitutional and legal prerogatives of the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Judicial Inspection. These material activities, as it turned out, occurred at least between 2009 and 2018, when these Protocols were unveiled and had the undoubtful character of political police;

7) listening to telephones as well as mass population surveillance activities, including in the private area, outside the legal framework: after disclosure, these practices were found to be illegal by the courts and by the Constitutional Court;

1.3. Immediately after disclosing, all signatory institutions immediately denounced the Protocols, this being indisputable proof that these institutions have known since signing that the Protocols were unlawful and unconstitutional and have assumed the illegality status, with the specific determination of the political police. Many of the generals in the RIS command structure were removed, at the pressure of public opinion. The criminal cases that were in progress, which have been proven to have been carried out with the application of the Protocols, have been rejected by the courts, and the courts have declared these Protocols as being illegal, dismantling the actions taken under the Protocols. The judges' associations have vehemently criticized the Protocols as well as the Superior Council of Magistracy, and the President of the High Court has tried to circumstantiate, in order to save in extremis the credibility of the institution, severely affected in front of the public opinion. The Minister of Justice also formally denounced the Protocols.

1.4. There have also been made public unprecedented situations in democratic states such as mass telephoning surveillance of the population, the members of the Parliamentary Commission advancing the colossal number of 6 million people, most of them being fraudulently obtained by invoking national security, although the terrorist phenomenon is virtually non-existent in Romania, compared to other European countries, where there are a lot fewer such mandates of surveillance. The costs of these surveillances using public money were huge, money illegally spent in the hundreds of millions of euro.

1.5. The secret protocols have flagrantly violated the principle of the criminal proceedings legality, stipulated in art. 23 (1) of the Constitution: "No punishment can be established or enforced unless under the conditions and in the spirit of the law." There have also been flagrant violations of art. 1, art. 2, art. 3, art. 4, art. 5, art. 7, art. 8, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11 of the Criminal Procedure Code, basically all the principles governing the criminal case process (the criminal trial legality, the presumption of innocence, of finding the truth, the fairness of the criminal trial, the right to freedom and security, the right to defence, the respect for human dignity and privacy).

1.6. The situation described above proves a genuine abolition of the rule of law in Romania, both the means used, by abolishing the legal and constitutional frameworks, but also by their systemic use, their para-institutional, secret and exorbitant control over the whole justice system, outside any democratic control and by removing all the possibilities of exercising citizens' rights, and represents a real confiscation of statehood in Romania by illegitimate groups, that have removed the law enforcement institutions from the constitutional and legal frameworks and used them for their own benefit.

The secret protocols representing additions and amendments to the criminal and procedural laws are also an attack on the Parliament, "the sole legislator of the country" (Article 61 of the Constitution), their signatory institutions unlawfully taking over their law-making function.

2. The CVM Report dated 13.11.2018 refused to take note of the Secret Protocols’ status that abolished the rule of law, contrary to the express requests of the Government and most of the Romanian MEPs, as well as of many MEPs from other states. Through their silence, the Commission and the perpetrators proved to be accomplices of the underground actions against the rule of law in Romania.

2.1. The above information was public and the subject of a wide-ranging debate that involved the entire Romanian society and all institutions in the justice area, but also the Parliament, the Government of Romania and the RIS. The information was accessible by the perpetrators and the Commission from open sources. Moreover, within the CVM Report of 13.11.2018 drafting process, the Government and other institutions with a formal role in the mechanism have insistently demanded that the realities in the justice area and the status of the Secret Protocols to be the subject of the Report, having a direct link with the rule of law. The perpetrators have refused, in an obvious way, to cover up the sinister reality that began and subjected to terror the entire society even during the CVM exercise.

The behaviour of the perpetrators indicates that abuses and the Protocols have been implemented with the consent of the European Commission's representatives, these using the Commission for political police and mafia-style purposes.

In this chapter, the undersigned, by means of Razvan Savaliuc, following years of studies on the corruption of the Romanian justice system, sent the Deputy President of the European Commission, Frans Timmermans, the wide "Report on Subversive activity in the Justice and Information Services 2005-2017" drafted by the Lumea Justitiei editorial team in November 2017 and sent via special post in Brussels in the attention of Frans Timmermans (in German) and Vera Joukova (in English), the European Commissioner for Justice. The perpetrator Frans Timmermans responded to us on January 29, 2018 that he was aware of the content of our complaints about the secret normative acts (protocols) between the information services, prosecutors and courts, which turned Romania into a "tactical field" but that he is not interested because: "CVM criteria does not extend to information activities and democratic control over these activities and are therefore not subject to the CVM Reports."

We reproduce below the response received:

<<<<<<<<

European Commission

Secretariat General

Directorate E – Policy Coordination II

SG.E.1. – Citizens and Security

Brussels, SG/E1/LDL/cj/ - 29.01.2018

To: Mr. Razvan Savaliuc

Email: rsziua@yahoo.com

Dear Mr. Savaliuc,

Thank you for the November 9th Report to Vice-President Frans Timmermans, in which you expressed your concern about the situation in Romania. I write to you on his behalf and apologize for the late answer I am sending you.

The European Commission is closely monitoring the progress in Romania related to justice reform and combating corruption within the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). In this context, on November 15th, it published a final Report (2) on Romania's progress. The Report as well as the other previous Reports can be consulted on the website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/rule-law/assistance-bulgaria-and-romania-under-cvm/Reports-progress-bulgaria-and-romania

In the context of CVM, the Commission is closely monitoring the various debates on Romanian justice. The independence of justice, separation of powers and the collaboration between state institutions are important subjects in the context of the CVM, which the Commission has dealt with in detail in the Reports presented. However, we want to emphasize that CVM criteria does not extend to intelligence and democratic control over these activities and are therefore is not subject to the CVM Reports.

Based on its responsibility to the Romanian citizens but also to the European Union, the Commission must continue to work closely with Romania in order to achieve the CVM goals. On the occasion of the State of Union speech, in September 2017, President Juncker underlined the importance of the rule of law and of the independence of the judiciary in all the Member States of the European Union (2).

Kind regards,

Julien Mousnier

Head of Unit

(1) https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/comm-2017-751_de.pdf

(2) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/state-union-2017_de

>>>>>>>

It is obvious to any common-sense observer that you cannot officially order the European Commission to have the right to monitor a state's justice system, but when it comes to knowing that intelligence services have corrupted justice, to claim that it exceeds the CVM attributions.

2.2. The same strategy, to act by omission and eviction, was used by the perpetrators on behalf of the Commission also on the other extremely serious issues:

1) cases produced by prosecutors through falsification of evidence;

2) blackmailing denouncers and witnesses;

3) forgery of telephone records in court;

4) harassment of political leaders through open and then, subsequent to their removal from public positions, closed cases;

5) forcing ministers and prime ministers to resign, through fabricated cases;

6) the existence of hundreds of court acquittal decisions on politicians or dignitaries after they were preventively arrested and publicly destroyed, their political careers and families being destroyed;

7) the systematic actions against the families of those who have been transformed into NAD targets;

8) trampling on the presumption of innocence, with a media lynching system, the NAD being in contact with journalists who were undercover officers;

9) the direct intention, declared publicly by the former NAD head, to attack deputies, senators, prime ministers of Romania, in order to instigate public opinion against the Parliament and the Government;

10) focusing of NAD actions on a precise area of ​​Romanian politics for the benefit of the other group, the cases of those under protection having non-working status and being used as blackmail weapons;

11) the fact that thousands of criminal cases were filed with the NAD against judges, members of the SCM, of the Judicial Inspection, the logical sense being that they were used as blackmail weapons, to obtain unjust solutions, etc.

2.3. Materially, the CVM Report refused to take note of and analyse extremely serious situations, which, by themselves, constituted disturbing attacks on the rule of law, such as:

1) the preventive arrest and removal from office of a Constitutional Court judge, who would have refused to comply with orders from the secret services area to resolve some Court Decisions: the judge was subsequently acquitted by the supreme court as innocent;

2) the arrest of the former FSA President, who was removed from office and subsequently declared innocent by the supreme court;

3) the blackmail attempt of another judge of the Constitutional Court by the President in office of Romania, in order to be determined to give a solution in his favour, in which case, the presidential councillor through whom the intervention was done, was forced to resign;

4) the prosecution of the entire command structure of the secret service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the same time with the destruction of this service, which is not under the control of RIS, afterwards all officers revoked from office due to the prosecution, being removed from criminal prosecution by the hierarchically superior prosecutor;

5) producing a criminal case against a Romanian general prosecutor in office, obliged to resign for the lack of obedience, him being replaced by the current general prosecutor by an illegal procedure, the latter being also a signatory of a secret protocol;

6) the prosecution and suing of the President of the Romanian Senate, subsequently declared innocent by the supreme court, which was put under telephone and physical surveillance and even in the private area for 7 years by the prosecutors and the force structures, the person being a strong opponent of the violation of the rule of law;

7) the cases opened by the NAD for the prosecution of some dignitaries and officials in connection with the legislative act, in which case the Constitutional Court intervened and declared the prosecutor’s actions as unconstitutional, as we have shown above;

8) the preventive arrest of a High Court of Cassation judge, right from the courtroom, for another judge to enter the panel to decide on a solution that is alleged to have been politically ordered. Subsequently, the respective judge died under suspicious circumstances in prison, shortly before his release, following serious abuse from the prison workers, and there was also a suspicion that he should have been prevented from making disclosures when exiting imprisonment with regard to NAD and RIS practices;

9) death in the penitentiary, also in the context of abusive practices on an important businessperson from the political area;

10) the opening of criminal cases to ministers and prime ministers, in order for them to become forced to resign, which has happened, after which they were declared innocent;

11) eliminating even from the NAD structure of uncompliant prosecutors, who refused to align with the abusive practices and denounced these practices, by producing criminal cases, including addressing them, etc.

2.4. The removal of all the above situations from the CVM Report represents a gross falsification of the realities of the justice system and the rule of law in Romania. This omission raises the suspicion that the Commission has, through the perpetrators, consented from the outset the creation of this secret state confiscation system and political police, transforming itself from an instrument of implementing the rule of law, into a tool of destroying it.

2.5. The CVM Reports drafted under the authority of the perpetrators not only pulled them down, misleading the European fora and the domestic and international public opinion, and hiding the terrible realities about the destruction of the rule of law in Romania but have given support and legitimacy to the political police, comparable to the communist gulag of the 50s and of last century’s 20s to the 30s Europe. The CVM Reports congratulated and unconditionally supported the former Chief Prosecutor and the current Prosecutor General of Romania, responsible for this sinister situation, of systematic violations of citizens' rights and freedoms.

2.6. Also, the CVM Reports were instruments to compromise all efforts made by most Romanian society and the fundamental political institutions, the Parliament, the Government, and the Constitutional Court, including the voices of the Superior Council of Magistracy, through direct or indirect public accusations against those who evoked and proved abuses, to discourage them. At the same time, the CVM Reports conducted under the co-ordination of the perpetrators had the role of encouraging and legitimizing a real essence insurgency movement, which dynamited the Romanian society through the hate and extreme violence discourses, which systematically acted against the rule of law. In this context, the CVM Reports were designed as an open attack on Romanian democracy, a situation, which threatened Romania's national security.

2.7. We quote below the reference in the CVM Report to the Secret Protocols in order to cover their gravity, the octopus which was constituted in their basis. The reference is made to Chapter 2 of the Report - General Situation - which indicates, even by the writing manner, that the issue will not be followed by measures and recommendations:

 ”One of such broader factors has been publicly-debated claims that cooperation agreements between the judicial institutions, notably the prosecution, and the Romanian Intelligence Services were the source of systemic abuse, in particular in corruption cases. Those classified agreements have been cited as the reason for sudden legislative changes and heavy criticism of the magistracy. The operation of the intelligence services is not a matter for the EU and falls outside the CVM benchmarks.

It is the role of the courts to establish whether specific allegations of abuses are substantiated, and an open and impartial investigation would be needed to establish whether there were systemic failures such as illegal gathering of evidence or illegal influence on magistrates, and whether the existing legal safeguards need to be strengthened. It is clearly important to ensure a framework where the intelligence services are under proper supervision, where crimes can be effectively investigated and sanctioned while fully respecting fundamental rights, and where the public can have confidence that judicial independence is secure. Expertise from other Member States could be valuable in building a stronger system for surveillance measures used by the prosecution and for the collaboration between the intelligence services and the prosecution essential for pursuing serious crime such as terrorism and cybercrime.”

From this text of the Report (pages 2, 3) we draw the following material conclusions:

2.7.1. This would be about "public debates" and not material evidence, which included the Protocols’ contents, which added to the criminal law and procedural-criminal law. The perpetrators, from the very beginning, defy the meaning of the Protocols to justify ignoring them. The action is a criminal form of abuse of office, intellectual forgery and communication of false information, organized criminal group constituency.

2.7.2. The perpetrators add that the secret protocols would have been only a pretext for "sudden legislative changes and heavy criticism of the magistracy", in the sense of exaggerating and seeking incorrect justifications for amending the legislation. "Heavy criticism" was formulated, according to the perpetrator, against the "magistracy" and not against abusive acts, again, tendentious and false support, in the same style of perverting the truth. The allegation proves complicity and fabricates the harsh reality.

2.7.3. Through the same rhetoric, by which the perpetrator defies the legal realities in Romania defined as a police state on the model of the communist gulag, taking the role of lawyer of the illegitimate state, the CVM's lack of competence in this matter is invoked. Thus, it is stated that the activity of the secret services does not fall within the Commission's area of ​​competence. Again, a false statement, because these Protocols do not concern the activity of the secret services, which is legally regulated, but the activity of the judicial institutions: these judicial institutions have signed the Protocols with the secret services and let the criminal instruction in their hands, led by Laura Codruta Kovesi and Augustin Lazar, the people raised by the CVM to the justice heroes ranks. This is not about the "activity of secret services", as the CVM claims, but about the judicial activity, confiscated by the secret services, outside the legal framework. This approach clearly hinders the purpose for which the CVM has been set up, to implement the rule of law that was transformed into a tool to support and defend the dictatorial state. The perpetrator’s job responsibilities are violated in the sense of criminal law.

2.7.4. The perpetrator also finds the solution to wash his hands, that it is the courts that have to establish the "allegations of abuse", although the Protocols are obviously normative acts – as were also declared by the Minister Justice - which adds to the criminal law, without their source being the legislative power, being in fact a matter of law, of the system, and not issues of the probation area, which are at the discretion of the courts.

It is a matter of the existence or non-existence of the rule of law, the very existence of the Protocols representing a state of danger to the constitutional order. The perpetrators’ interpretation, for omitting the Protocols’ real situation in the Report, is to justify and encourage the police state, a situation incompatible with the job responsibilities and the official purpose of the CVM.

2.7.5. The Report does not say a word about the Protocols concluded with the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Superior Council of Magistracy or the Judicial Inspection, situations that even the rhetoric of "allegations", of "if it were necessary", of "determining whether there were systemic deficiencies", "the expertise that could be useful" could not have justified.

2.7.6. Without further analysis, it is obvious that the perpetrators have, in essence, used the CVM to detour from the real problems in Romania in order to preserve the police state. The dubitative discourse in the General Situation was replaced in Conclusions with the imperative and ultimate style, characteristic to the Political Dictate, calling for the dissolution of Romanian statehood: this technique of deceiving, falsifying the reality and artificially creating the prerequisites of an accusation against Romania, was used in Romania in the political trials of last century’s 1950s via the Bolshevik rhetoric. By means of seemingly "legal reasoning" techniques, the entire interwar elite of Romania was sent to extermination camps on behalf of the "Romanian people".

2.8. The omission in a legal act, allegedly opposable to the Romanian state, is an attack on the principles of positive law, the competences and attributions of the European Commission, as well as the Romanian State, the Romanian Constitution, the Treaty of the Union, the Romanian people and the Union’s Member States. The systematic omission is the violation of the job responsibilities of the perpetrators by committing the offenses mentioned above.

3. Listing the other actions of the perpetrator, of denial and demonization of Romania’s statehood, in violation of the Treaty of the Union and the objectives of CVM decided by the Commission Decision

The whole body of the Report is a series of inadequacies, the distortion of legal and institutional realities being the consequence of a modus operandi, which we have described above. The direct goal was to pervert CVM's "benchmarking" objectives, namely "empowering and streamlining the judiciary and law enforcement agencies (...) to achieve specific benchmarks in the field of judicial reform and fight against corruption", in their opposite, in objectives for the establishment of political police, undermining the Constitution and the democracy, the Report being transformed into a political dictate by committing crimes.

Below are other actions of the perpetrators that prove that the CVM Report is, in our opinion, a wholly criminal product:

3.1. The direct and impetuous appeal of the revocation of the former NAD Chief Prosecutor, Laura Codruta Kovesi, against the express provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court's rulings and the legislation in the matter. The Commission does not have the competencies and powers with regard to the provisions of the Constitution, a situation settled by several express decisions of the Constitutional Courts in Europe. The Constitutional Court also does not fall within the Commission's area of activity, according to the Treaty of the Union. Thus, on page 5 of the Report it was stated:

"3.1. The direct and vehement appeal of the dismissal of the former DNA Chief Prosecutor, Laura Codruta Kovesi, against the express provisions of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court's rulings and the legislation in the matter. The Commission does not have powers and powers with regard to the provisions of the Constitution, a situation settled by several express decisions of the Constitutional Courts in Europe. The Constitutional Court also does not fall within the Commission's sphere of activity, according to the Treaty of the Union. Thus, on page 5 of the Report it was stated: "At the same time as the legal amendments, specific decisions have underlined the consequences of the concentration of power in the hands of the Minister of Justice. This was the case first with the dismissal of the Chief Prosecutor of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) at the request of the Minister of Justice. In a first stage, the President of Romania rejected the proposed dismissal, in line with the negative opinion of the Superior Council of the Magistracy. However, a Constitutional Court Decision in May (Dec. 358/2018) on the dismissal procedure reinforced the trend of increased power for the Minister: following the ruling, the President was required to sign the decree implementing the dismissal in July.”

The considerations are offensive to the Romanian state, made by violating and overstepping the Commission's competences. In fact, the Constitutional Court did not "strengthen the tendency to grant increased powers to the Minister of Justice", but interpreted Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution, ascertaining the role that the Minister was assigned to, by the Constitution. By this abusive interpretation, the perpetrators in fact dispute the authority of the CCR and its decision, so that, afterwards, it could order Dictate measures to the Romanian state: the act is a crime. Once again, the perpetrator proved complicity with the anti-constitutional actions of the former NAD Chief Prosecutor, actions established by the Constitutional Court itself. The perpetrator, in its endeavour of perverting the legal reality, makes no reference to the reasons referred to by the Minister of Justice in the Revocation Act, for reasons of extreme gravity: the same manipulation technique (modus operandi) is used.

3.2. The perpetrators have the same attitude on the request for revocation of the current General Prosecutor, to whom the same Constitutional Court Decision applies. In the same criminal omissive style, the perpetrator does not refer to the extremely grave reasoning in the minister's revocation proposal: repeated violations of the law and constitution, political partisanship, illegality of appointment, the patronage of the Public Ministry, turned into political police. The perpetrators also defy the fact that the General Prosecutor is the signatory of a Secret Protocol with the RIS by which it was added to the criminal law. In the same context, the perpetrators attack the Parliament on the option to refer to the Constitutional Court, a constitutional right of the legislature, to support the general prosecutor, one of the heads of the police regime, according to the motivation of the minister of justice, which the perpetrators keep from mentioning. (See page 5 of the Report)

3.3. In the same context, the perpetrator attacks the Government on the option to refer the Constitutional Court to the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

The fear of the perpetrators of the Constitutional Court is permanent, the message being that the judiciary should be allowed to function outside the constitutional framework, as a caste, torn away from the constitutional democracy rules and against citizens' rights and freedoms, subdued to groups of interests. (See page 5).

3.5. An also unacceptable and anti-legal position is taken by the perpetrator on the Judicial Inspection, evoking "causes for concern", among other things because "the Judicial Inspectorate organized a series of inspections at the General Prosecutor's Office and at the National Anticorruption Directorate". "The concerns" of the perpetrators are related to the fear that the Judicial Inspection will not find abuses of the General Prosecutor and the NAD, using the Report to intimidate the Inspection, in order not to uncover the illegalities. The perpetrator reaffirms its role of a defender of abuse and of protector of those who have violated the law, and the attack on the Judicial Inspection is indisputable. The dishonesty of the perpetrator is also proved by the observation: "The fact that in at least two of the cases the information came to the press before the end of the control gave rise to great controversy": not the same approach as in the case of hundreds of NAD cases from which samples were sent to the press, even counterfeited ones, before the suspects were heard, being already prosecuted and charged by the prosecutors, with the flagrant violation of the presumption of innocence for at least 10 years, practically day by day, the NAD was transformed in a Bolshevik-type institution, for destroying destinies, but also the massacring of the entire political class, in an unprecedented action in the democratic world. Those actions were supported and applauded by the perpetrators, complicit in an ample public opinion intoxication and state control activity by inducing fear and hatred throughout society. Instead, as this Report shows, the perpetrator does not accept the public debate against NAD abuses, seeking to inhibit the Judicial Inspection. (See page 6 of the Report).

3.6. The Report subdues the SCM to intimidation and pressures, using the same manipulative techniques, incompatible with the rule of law, for the benefit of the abusive magistrates whom the perpetrator wishes to ensure the impunity: "The Superior Council of Magistracy was not able to act as an effective controlling factor and equilibrium to defend the independence of the pressured judicial institutions(...)"; "Although in 2018 judicial institutions and some judges and prosecutors have been the subject of particularly tough public criticism from Government and Parliament representatives, the Council has been reluctant to take ex officio decisions in response to attacks on the independence of the judiciary." (See page 6 of the Report).

The perpetrator uses the same manipulative, distorting technique in attacking the SCM:

1) The Report’s content does not refer to specific situations in which the SCM would not have fulfilled its attributions of defending the independence of the judiciary, so that the accusation to not be able to be contradicted;

2) The perpetrator speaks of "institutions subject to pressure", although the criticism targeted individuals - judges and prosecutors - in connection with material causes, abuses and evidence beyond doubt - and not "institutions".

The technique criminal by essence, used only in dictatorships, is unacceptable in an official act: people are assimilated to institutions, and whoever criticizes them, criticizes the institutions themselves, the rule of law, etc. Any criticism is, by itself, a dangerous act against the state. By this technique the perpetrator defended the severe abuses, including the violations of the Constitution by Laura Codruta Kovesi and Augustin Lazar, the latter being, in the perception of the perpetrators, the incarnated institutions and state;

3) The same diversionary technique, which has nothing to do with legal reasoning, is used the perpetrator when speaking of "extremely harsh criticism from Government and Parliament representatives": a) there is only one Government representative, the Prime Minister, the use of the plural form being from the beginning an excess, the desire to give rise to non-existent facts: if there was criticism from some ministers in their own name, that does not mean that they represented the Government as an institution, what the perpetrator is saying, with the direct intent to attack the Governmental institution; b) the Parliament is represented only by the two presidents of the Chambers and only in the situation they perform the role of representation. The perpetrators do not refer to such situations, but attack the Parliament as a whole, referring to the political statements of lawmakers, who are free. This technique is incompatible with the job responsibilities of the perpetrators, that, in the criminal action of defending the abuses, compromise the institutions in their entirety;

4) The perpetrators ask the SCM to condemn ex officio anyone who would dare reveal the abuses of some people, presented as incarnation of the state and justice, persons that must enjoy total protection. The intention is to ensure the impunity of those responsible for severe acts of corruption and abuse that we can qualify as mafia-type, which have been the subject of disclosures in the cases of former deputy Sebastian Ghita, of the Cozma family in Ploiesti, Mariana Rarinca, the constitutional judge Toni Grebla, etc., where the names of prosecutors Negulescu, Onea, Kovesi, of the judge Livia Stanciu, other senior magistrates were circulated. The action of the perpetrators, pf intimidating the SCM, represents a serious violation of their job responsibilities.

3.7. We present below some of the texts in the CVM Report, through which the perpetrators abusively assume the prerogative of controlling the entire legislative process in order to protect the police state:

3.7.1. On page 7 of the Report it is stated that: ”Since the last CVM Report, criticism of the judicial system and magistrates in the media and from the Government and the Parliament representatives has continued. Throughout 2018, there was regular criticism targeting the judiciary as a whole, in particular the institutions dealing with high-level corruption, as well as individual magistrates. This entails a clear risk to public trust in the judiciary. This confirms the need for action to discourage open challenges to the independence of justice and the authority of court decisions.”

As we have already said, the phrase "representatives of Government and Parliament" is wrong, meant to accuse the two institutions, the criticism being made by ministers or Parliamentarians, not on behalf of the institutions. From the very beginning, the statement is likely to inhibit the freedom of expression and the right to make unhindered political statements under the protection of immunity.

On the other hand, the text does not show that these "criticisms" are unfounded, but they fear that these criticisms would weaken the "public confidence in the judiciary". In the same diversionary style, the perpetrators seek the concealment of the giant abuses of the justice, in the name of anti-corruption fighting, some of which being mentioned above, which were the real subject of powerful criticism of the ways of the judiciary:

a) politicians and dignitaries unjustly arrested;

b) the systematic use of false evidence, blackmailed offenders, blackmail practices and threats of criminal law subjects and their families, violation of the presumption of innocence;

c) taking over the entire control of the criminal instruction and the institutions of justice by the Romanian Intelligence Service;

d) controlling the formation of the Government or of the Parliamentary majority through manufactured criminal cases, etc. All these massive abuses, which have destroyed thousands of innocent people, should not be discussed in public in the opinion of the perpetrators Timmermans and Jourova, on the grounds that it would weaken "public confidence in the judiciary".

This attitude is contrary to the rule of law and to the democracy, with the European Court having several decisions on the right to free debate and criticism, including final rulings. The perpetrators, actually, the apologetic state where people will be condemned by public opinion, and not by justice, the loss of "trust" fearing explicitly the fact that the public opinion, after discovering an abuse, might not further support the police state. For this, "criticism" must be stopped and even the representatives of citizens, the Parliamentarians, be silenced. In the circumstances in which the perpetrators failed to refer to the realities of justice mentioned above, their approach to becoming the protectors of the police state is unacceptable. "Public trust" cannot win in a state of law, by blocking, banning criticism, but by eliminating abuses: the attack on the free speech of Parliamentarians in this context is unacceptable, violating the Romanian Constitution. Obviously, the perpetrators want to hide the abuses, through the total omission from the Report, and the imposition of a Dictate of silence, protecting the abuse. The two European Commissioners have seriously violated their job responsibilities.

3.7.2. Page 9 of the Report challenges the law-making right of Parliament, and the entire ensemble of institutions with roles in the law-making process is challenged as well: “Said changes represent a profound revision of the codes from 2014, including those related to criminal investigations and trial-related procedures, as well as in relation to the balance between the public interest for crime sanctioning, victims’ rights and suspects’ rights. Also, the changes restrain the scope of corruption as a crime, which, if they were to be confirmed when the laws come back from Parliament after the decision of the Constitutional Court, would draw upon themselves the reassessment of the progress registered so far within the CVM.” 1) The criminal policy of Member States does not fall under the Treaty of ascension. By means of this, the perpetrators are attacking the legislative process regarding criminal policy and they perpetrate crimes, their opinions being non-opposable. 2) Based on what authority do the perpetrators decide in relation to the “balance between the public interest for sanctioning crimes and the victims’ rights and suspects’ rights”? What are the studies, researches which they can invoke for this purpose?

What institutions have carried out such researches, so that the perpetrators can invoke them? Obviously, there is no authority therein and behind this statement lays the same political and legal dictate. There is no community aquis in the sphere of criminal law. The perpetrator, in a ridiculous manner, substitutes himself with the “public interest” in Romania, in a situation in which in the European law systems, for example, there is no abuse of office, and the punishments are much less severe as compared to those from the Romanian law. The abuse of office is clear. 3) What are the criteria taken into account, the studies, the research etc. that consider that the “changes restrain the scope of corruption as a crime”? There is no crime entitled as such. The text represents a ridiculous, yet extremely severe attack, which challenges the right of Parliament to make laws, thus being in discontent with the real situation of justice in Romania. The Report has no legal and scientific grounds, and it is a disgrace for a high official of the Commission. By means of their attach against the right of Parliament to make laws and by means of their thoughtless assessments, which claim to be rightful rules, which are in fact assessments of politruks with totalitarian visions that exclusively support the repressive and abusive state, the perpetrators have breached their office responsibilities. They deem that, by means of such an inept document, they can substitute the entire institutional ensemble of the law-making process: Ministries, Government, Parliament, The Legislative Council, the Constitutional Court, the President of Romania, etc.

3.7.3. Page 10 of the Report challenges the constitutional right of the Government to issue emergency ordinances, in the same idea of not being qualified in terms of the law-making process: „Regardless of this, the option of resorting to emergency procedures has highly limited the efficiency and credibility of these open approaches. It is still difficult to understand what objective reasons lie behind the passing of emergency procedures, as well as the fact that the emergency has not been subsequently assessed, taking into account the fundamental doubts expressed in relation to the drafts”. The text is incompetent, it does not bring fourth any argument, criterion, research, rationale or rightful principle. Even more so, considering that one has interfered in an area – the legislative one – that does not fall under the competencies of the Commission. The same abusive and threatening rhetoric, which is not based on anything else than the intention of the perpetrators to attack the institutions of the Romanian state and the law-making process in supporting and defending the police-based state.

The fact that in the prisons in Romania there are thousands of persons convicted with false evidence and with the enforcement of secret and unlawful Protocols, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights convicts Romania on a constant basis for the abuses perpetrated by judges, that the Romanian society is appalled by the political police, implanted in the enforcement period of the CVM, do not constitute „reasons of concern” for the higher officials of the Commission, who act, on the contrary, against the rule of law in Romania, using their positions and abusing the power offered by the vote of the European citizens. The sole motivation for this type of behaviour is that the perpetrators, the European Commissaries, have acted beyond their mandate as officials of the Union, in favour of illegitimate interest groups. The aforementioned criminal situation is supported by evidence.

3.8. The Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice (PICCJ) – The National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), the central institution of the political police, signatory of the secret protocols and perpetrator of the aforementioned abuses, which targeted including the destructuring of the Government and Parliament, object of many Decisions of the Constitutional Court, is transformed into a victim by the authors. The purpose: presenting all the other institutions as being corrupt institutions, and presenting Romania as being a corrupt state.

3.8.1. Item 3.3. of the Report is exclusively dedicated to the defence of the NAD’s (the National Anticorruption Directorate) abuses and to the challenging of all other institutions in the legal sphere: „The National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) has been a particular target in terms of pressure, likely to damage its independence.” (Page 15). One of the arguments is the establishment of the section for the criminal investigation of magistrates.

Still, the Report notes that the respective section was deemed constitutional by the Constitutional Court and the CVM has no right to challenge it, yet the perpetrator claims that the respective section represents a vulnerability in terms of fighting corruption: „The establishment of the new section for investigation of offences committed by magistrates in the amended Justice laws creates a specific concern with regard to the fight against corruption, as a new structure could be more vulnerable in terms of independence than has been the case so far with the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA), as it could be used as an additional instrument to intimidate and put pressure on magistrates.” (Page 16). The perpetrators omit the real reasons, which led to the establishment of the section, opposed to their dissimulating claims. The official rationale was, on the contrary, to ensure independence and protection of magistrates that are investigated by magistrates, in order to avoid situations such as those presented above, in which the NAD (National Anticorruption Directorate) prosecutors blackmailed judges who were judging corruption cases with opened criminal case files against them, in order to obtain convictions, even if the case files were forged. At NAD level, there were a couple thousand case files identified, which were opened against judges and were left pending, obviously for blackmailing purposes. Also within the NAD, corruption case files were opened against certain members of the Superior Council Of Magistracy or of the Judicial Inspection, those who were about to disciplinary judge the NAD prosecutors. On the other hand, the possible abuses of the NAD prosecutors were closed also within the NAD, which was the competent Prosecutor’s office to investigate the latter. Basically, NAD was transformed in a closed political police institution, based on the Gestapo modes and the Nazi SS. The perpetrators omit these realities, situation which proves that they knew about the political police system at NAD level, they vouched for it and now that these realities are about to be uncovered, they continue to support this sinister institution. The political police was established in Romania after the creation of the CVM (2006), which thus leads to the suspicion that this mechanism was used for implementing a political police in Romania, situation that is the object of the investigations.

3.8.2. Another preoccupation of the perpetrators is the explicit control of Parliament and the Government on the right of the Romanian people to freely vote.

They, by means of the Report, interfere in the activity of Parliament, which is, from the start, a breach of office responsibilities, as the Parliaments cannot be controlled by the Commission. We quote from the Report: „Recommendation 10 concerns the accountability of the Parliament in its decisions on requests from the prosecution to authorise preventative measures such as searches or arrest and on requests to authorise the investigation of an MP when he/she is also or has been a Minister. This is a power under the Constitution, mirroring many Parliamentary systems where immunities exist to protect Members of Parliament in the exercise of their elective mandate. The recommendation concerns not the fact that this power exists, but the way in which it is exercised. Previous CVM Reports have highlighted the importance of transparent criteria to help Parliament demonstrate that it is exercising this power in an objective way.” (Page 17)

Without any right in this sense, the authors introduce the idea that the Parliament institution is a corrupt one, and that it protects, by means of the immunity institution, Parliament members from NAD actions. Their assessment is unacceptable, and the Commission does not have the right to censor in any way the free vote of deputies and senators, which is a general given in all democratic constitutions. Also, the fact that the perpetrators speak of an „accountability of the Parliament” in what concerns the exercise of the Parliament members’ mandate, in the case of the immunity institution, for enacting a direct attack against the supremacy of the Constitution and the Parliament, as a representative entity of the Romanian people. This is, again, an attack against the constitutional democracy. Also, the perpetrators are fully aware that they are exceeding their legal framework and they are abusing their office, interfering in the activity of the Parliament, the Report stating under page 2: „The January 2017 Report noted that there were societal, legal and political factors which, although not within the scope of the CVM and not covered by its recommendations, "have a direct bearing on the ability to deliver reform and in particular have made it more difficult for Romania to show that reform has taken root on a permanent basis". Points noted included a legislative practice still to develop better regulation principles, confrontation between state actors, and a difficult media environment. ”; also, under page 3 of the Report the following is mentioned: „The November 2017 Report had already underlined the need for the Government and the Parliament to ensure an open, transparent and constructive legislative process, in which judicial independence and the opinion of the judiciary is valued and given due account”

In the first paragraph, the perpetrators admit that the legislative process does not fall under the competence of the CVM. However, the entire CVM exclusively refers to the legislative process, under the pretext of „fight against corruption” and „independence of justice”, and thus the perpetrators, in an unacceptable manner, request the subordination of the Parliament and Government in the legislative process to the judicial authority, which in fact represents the subordination to NAD, led by Laura Codruta Kovesi and the Public Ministry, led by Augustin Lazar. All of these requests are unacceptable and unjustified, thus negating, on one hand, the principle of separating powers within the state and, on the other hand, the legislative role of the Parliament, the supremacy of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the Romanian people.

These statements are legal aberrations, which compromise the institution of the European Commission, and, in the context of this Criminal Complaint, represent an irrefutable proof of the complicity of the perpetrators with the police state, comparable to the Nazi Gestapo and the Bolshevik KGB.

The main concern of the CVM is, in essence, the control of entities elected by the people: Parliament and Government, with the hand of the political police represented by abusive and corrupt magistrates. The breach of service responsibilities of the perpetrators, in terms of respecting the Treaty of the European Union, the rule of law, democracy and rights and freedoms of the citizens – firstly, the right to elect – represent a crime.

3.8.3. The references made under items 3.8.1. and 3.8.2. indicate the preoccupation of the perpetrator to eliminate control factors of the activity of NAD prosecutors, with the risk of illegal interference in the activity of Parliament and the negation of the freedom to vote, in fact proving that, in the perpetrators’ opinion, NAD represented, and must represent in the future, a political police instrument, by means of which one can control Parliament and Government, and the criminal activities of NAD cannot be verified by an independent section of prosecutors.

* * *

IV. THE VENICE COMMISSION AND GRECO – ENTITIES THAT ARE NOT PART OF THE EU ENTITIES – ABUSIVELY USED IN THE REPORT, BY BREACH OF THE UNION TREATY AND BREACH OF THE OFFICE COMPETENCIES

1.1. The Venice Commission and GRECO are two entities working under the authority of the Council of Europe, but they are not part of the entities of the European Union and as such, they are not under the authority of the European Commission, whose functioning is represented by the perpetrators. The Council of Europe is independent from the European Union.

1.2. The Venice Commission is a consultative entity of the Council of Europe, consisting of specialists in constitutional law: the commission was established in 1990, after the fall of the Berlin wall, especially for granting legal assistance in the field of constitutional aspects in former communist states. This entity does not have within its scope of work the fight against corruption, does not dispose of a working apparatus or expertise for this specialised activity. The Commission issues opinions related to aspects of constitutional law, related to the constitutions of Member States to the Council of Europe, as well as opinions on matters related to para-constitutional law (laws that stem from constitutions, but regulate areas close to the constitutions). The statute of the commission is a consultative one, the endorsements they enact are not mandatory, are not imposed to the states, and their approach is a non-directive one, based on dialogue.

1.3. GRECO – The Group of states against corruption – was established in 1999, within the Council of Europe, having as objective: „to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption standards through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure. It helps to identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, prompting the necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a platform for the sharing of best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.” (Official website presentation) The GRECO activity is regulated by a Regulation, which provides two action stages:

1) the assessment stage, which is carried out based on an analysis of the situation of the Member State by a team of assessors, with the participation of the respective state representatives, and of the civil society. After the analysis, a Report project is drafted, which is then sent to the state for comments, before GRECO subjects it to an enforcement assessment. If the assessment concludes that the legislation and practice thereof are not satisfactory, conclusion are then drafted, and the states are invited to respond to said conclusions within 18 months, without being subject to any obligation in this sense; 2) the second stage is the „compliance procedure”, in case the states do not comply with the recommendations, GRECO „re-examines the respective recommendations” within an additional 18-month period. If the states refuse to comply, the internal regulation of GRECO states „the opening of a special procedure, based on a progressive approach, in relation to the members for whom the enforcement of the recommendations was deemed as being totally unsatisfactory”. As such, GRECO, in case a state refuses to comply, does not possess the sanctioning tools in a dissuasive manner such as those of the European Union, which is not related to the Council of Europe, as they are completely different institutions, with separate purposes and modus operandi. For example, based on the fact that Russia and Turkey are Member States of the Council of Europe, to suppose that they are under the obligation to enforce the norms of the Treaty of the European Union, is an absurdity, and this is a sufficient argument, in order to understand the major difference between the two organisations.

1.4. In their statute as officials of the European Union, they are subject exclusively to the norms of the Treaty of the European Union and its organisation and functioning regulations, as such the perpetrators have thus perpetrated the crime of abuse of office, by taking over competencies and tasks of other institutions – the Council of Europe – whom they granted another scope and meaning, acting as if they were entities of the Union and they must comply with the regulations of the Treaty of the European Union. This deed is an extremely severe one, considering that the perpetrators, by means of abuse of office, are changing the real force and legal meaning of the acts of the Venice Commission and GRECO, granting them this political and legal sanctioning authority based on the Treaty of the European Union, outside of the legal framework. The CVM is a mechanism exclusively belonging to the European Commission, within a clear procedure established with the Romanian state that cannot usurp competencies and responsibilities of other organisations, which are regulated by a different treaty (the Council of Europe) and function based on other regulations. The perpetrator has breached at the same time the Treaty of the European Union, as well as the Treaty of the Council of Europe, thus creating an extremely dangerous precedent, in terms of international law.

1.5. The main direction the perpetrator grants, in relation to the Venice Commission and GRECO, relates to using the CVM in order to transform their recommendations into a political and legal dictate, with the instruments available to the Union, even though these recommendations are not mandatory, in the case of the Venice Commission, and, in the case of GRECO, the obligations relate to completely different aspects, as compared to those that can stem from the Treaty of the European Union.

The perpetrators Frans Timmermans and Vera Jourova distorted the competencies of the Union and of the Council of Europe in order to unlawfully punish Romania.

1.6. The fraudulent use of the Venice Commission and GRECO was caused by the lack of argumentation of the Report, from a scientific point of view, in terms of the political and partisan content of the latter. The inclusion within the CVM of the two organisations had the role of creating another legal and factual appearance. But, as it can be noticed, the clear recommendations of the Venice Commission or GRECO were not even highlighted by the Report. The perpetrators used a severe manipulation technique, in order to include the two organisations in the underlying objective of supporting a police state, as the recommendations were taken out of the context of their own approaches and conclusions, and were associated to a different, manipulative and dissimulating proceeding.

1.7. In addition to the aforementioned, the references of the perpetrator in relation to the Venice Commission and GRECO from the CVM are thus null and void.

1.8. The Reports of the Romanian state with the two organisations of the Council of Europe are related exclusively to the proceedings of the Council of Europe and follow the path set out by those procedures. A part of the recommendations were adopted by Parliament, the others, which are optional in nature, are to the subject of common procedures between the Romanian state, on one hand, and the Venice Commission or GRECO, on the other hand, without the intervention of the Union by means of the EC, which does not possess competencies regulated within the Treaty of the European Union.

* * *

V. DISSIMULATION: SUPPORTING AND DEFENDING THE ABUSES AND THE POLICE STATE, DISSIMULATED UNDER THE APPEARANCE OF SUPPORTING „THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM” AND THE „FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION”

1.1. From the point of view of the subjective side, the perpetrators acted with direct intent. The entire Report was designed and built to support and defend the police state, with the objective of undermining the rule of law, the rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens.

1.2. Such an egregious procedure could only be achieved through actions and concealed behaviour. The technique of dissimulation consists in the argument that the CVM supports and defends the "fight against corruption". The entire Report of November 13th, 2018 is apparently built for this purpose. Starting from this thesis, any criticism, revelation or doubt about the fairness of the act of doing justice in the name of the "fight against corruption" represents a danger that needs to be removed. The realities of the abusive justice system - confiscated by a group of people who turned state institutions into instruments of political blackmail, elimination of political opponents and undemocratic control of the Parliament and the Government, in order to instate a strict dictatorial regime,- they have not only been ignored by the perpetrators: they have turned the CVM into a punishment instrument for anyone who dared to denounce and change this political police system, for the purpose of settling in the constitutional framework.

1.3. The action of the perpetrators has been systematic and continuous to support and defend the group of people who have seized justice using it as a political weapon during their entire mandate of Commissioner and First Vice-President of the EC and Justice Commissioner. With flagrant breach of service duties, they have disposed of and agreed to omit any references in the CVM to the general principles of the rule of law and the functioning of an impartial and fair justice:

a) the principle of the lawfulness of the criminal proceeding;

b) the principle of finding the truth;

c) the principle of respect for the presumption of innocence;

d) the principle of the right to defence;

e) the principle of a fair and impartial trial;

f) the principle of respect for human dignity. All the above-mentioned disclosures, concerning criminal trials handled by the NAD, have been specifically and systematically ignored by the Report, in the criminal logic that, if ignored, they would in fact be justified.

The component of dissimulation /static the justification, coverage and impunity of persons responsible for the political police in Romania. We reiterate the fact that the Report intends to justify and give them legitimacy and legality through a manipulative technique enshrined by dictatorial states:

- a) the preventive arrest of a judge of the Constitutional Court in the exercise of his mandate (Toni Grebla), after he issued his stance against the excesses of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). After holding him in custody and terminating his position, followed by an unscheduled trial, the Supreme Court ordered his acquittal for the non-existence of the crime. Such a case is of extreme gravity, endangering national security;

- b) the fabrication of a criminal case file against the general prosecutor in office (Tiberiu Nitu), pursuant to which he was removed from his position, in order to illegally appoint a general prosecutor in his place who has clearly supported the abuses, a situation noticed even by the Constitutional Court, Signatory of a Secret Protocol. Later, after losing his position, the former public prosecutor Tiberiu Nitu was declared innocent;

- c) opening of a criminal trial against the President of the Romanian Senate in office (Calin Popescu Tariceanu), in which he was sent before a court of law and his image was compromised. Subsequently, the Supreme Court acquitted him. It has been revealed that he was put under complete surveillance, from phone call interceptions to official and private space recordings for 7 years, outside the legal framework, without detecting any illegality, even during the exercise of his senator mandate.

- d) the prosecution of the entire command structure of the Secret Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in parallel with the destruction of this institution through an emergency ordinance of the Government that has clearly placed itself on the side of legal abuses. The destructuring of an extremely important Secret Service of the state in an untimely manner, through the emergency ordinance, and the prosecution of the whole command structure at the same time, is a matter that threatens national security. Subsequently, the hierarchically superior prosecutor, who found that there was no evidence for the accusation, denied the accusations made by senior officers of the service;

- e) the opening of a criminal case file and investigation in force of some dignitaries for the law-making activity, by storming of the constitutional state institutions by the NAD in order to block and compromise the act of law-making (Government Emergency Ordinance 13/2017). Subsequently, the Constitutional Court declared the entire political police operation as being unconstitutional, by a Decision on this action of NAD itself;

- f) the preventive arrest that actually occurred in the court, of a judge of the Bucharest Court of Appeal (Stan Mustata) by NAD, for another judge to be appointed to the respective panel (Camelia Bogdan), at the time the conviction was pronounced of a notorious NAD political opponent. Judge Stan Mustata was then convicted and, shortly before his release, died in suspicious circumstances, and there are indications that his death had been caused by a third party, given that the judge had stated during his detention that someone was pursuing his death, in order for him not to do disclosure certain aspects upon his release. A recording was made in secret with Traian Basescu, the acting President of Romania at the time, who had explicitly stated that the arrest of Judge Stan Mustata, prior to his political adversary's trial, at the court, was planned by the chief of staff of the Romanian Intelligence Service (General Florian Coldea), as well as his replacement with Judge Camelia Bogdan, for the purpose of sentencing the maximum punishment for Dan Voiculescu, former senator and head of a political party, as well as patron of the press trust that made constant disclosures on the abuse of prosecutors and judges. The Superior Council of Magistracy eventually excluded that respective judge from the magistrate.

- g) the opening of multiple criminal case files against politicians, in order to prevent them from being nominated as ministers or prime ministers, inadvertently carried out by the NAD, even at the time of their nomination, with the intention to block their nomination through the criminal case file. This practice has been enforced for more than a decade, being a modus operandi of NAD. Through this practice, the political process of forming the Governments of Romania, as well as that of the Parliament, was controlled. Subsequently, those individuals were declared innocent.

- h) Certain proof of evidence falsification, forged criminal complaints obtained under blackmail, systematic threats to witnesses and/or families of those investigated, forgery of telephone conversations by prosecutors and secret service workers, in order to obtain convictions from judges, in countless NAD files. With regard to such cases, public prosecutors, under huge pressure from public opinion, have already prosecuted certain NAD prosecutors, after years of ignoring these allegations, although the evidence presented in the public space was overwhelming. Therefore, we are confronted with the identification of abuses made by the criminal prosecution bodies themselves, and not with "allegations" of witnesses, denouncers or other persons.

- i) the signing of Secret Protocols with the Information Services (SRI etc.) and the High Court of Cassation and Justice (ICCJ) by the former NAD chief Laura Codruta Kovesi and current Prosecutor General Augustin Lazar, currently under revocation procedure, individuals who were supported and praised for years by the CVM, under the patronage of the perpetrators, provided that there was direct evidence of serious abuse, including those listed above.

These Protocols are real acts; they are not "allegations", as the perpetrators have qualified them to be, in order to refute the finding that they are extreme actions against the rule of law.

In addition, against the two magistrates, whom the perpetrators supported and defended in the official CVM Report, Laura Codruta Kovesi and Augustin Lazar, the Constitutional Court disposed rulings, an unprecedented situation in the democratic world, again, based on clear and indisputable evidence of their abuses. Later, the Judicial Inspection and the Superior Council of Magistracy triggered numerous disciplinary checks.

- j) the establishment of a Parliamentary inquiry commission in relation to a conspirators meeting on the day of the presidential election in 2009, attended by Romanian Information Service (SRI) chiefs, high-ranking politicians, as well as the Romanian Attorney General, subsequently NAD Chief Prosecutor, Laura Codruta Kovesi. Laura Codruta Kovesi refused to attend the hearings in the Commission, although the Constitutional Court ordered a decision that stipulated her legal obligation to appear. Even after this abuse against the Constitution, the perpetrators and CVM continued to support Ms. Kovesi and consider her revocation to be an abuse, with serious accusations against the Minister of Justice, accusations of politicizing the revocation, an unacceptable stance of an institution of the Union, which aims at covering some acts of extreme gravity, incompatible with the position of chief prosecutor or prosecutor in any democratic state.

- k) setting up of thousands of criminal case files at NAD for judges and prosecutors, certain members of the Superior Council of Magistracy and Judicial Inspection, with the implicit purpose of blackmailing them, so that they can make decisions at the NAD’s request. At the same time, the refusal to investigate cases of abuse of certain NAD prosecutors, including NAD Chief Prosecutor, following complaints or criminal charges.

- l) the disposing of telephone communications interception, declared illegal by the courts of law and the Constitutional Court in their entirety, which targeted millions of citizens, with the violation of their rights and freedoms over a period of more than a decade, by NAD, in collaboration with the Romanian Information Service (SRI).

- m) the situation of Livia Stanciu, who, from a former communist prosecutor, was appointed as Chairwoman of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, through an exclusively political decision, scandalizing the entire body of judges. She officially declared that the High Court of Cassation and Justice is "the NAD partner" in the act of doing justice. It was later revealed that the High Court of Cassation and Justice signed a Collaboration Protocol with the Romanian Information Service (SRI), and SRI Officers "collaborated" with High Court of Cassation and Justice Judges in evidence management in criminal case files and formulated consultations for judges, upon issuance of resolutions. The activity of SRI Officers in criminal case files has been officially confirmed as being present in the criminal investigation proceedings as well, with indications that they drafted even the indictments, under the protection of the illegal Secrets Protocols. The testimonies inside the system have revealed the existence of information that was reserved only to the judges, and it was forbidden for lawyers to know this information. The position of Ms. Livia Stanciu within the system, as Chairwoman of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, proves the existence of an institutionalized political police system at the highest level of the High Court's leadership.

- n) the case file in which Livia Stanciu, as High Court of Cassation and Justice chairwoman, filed a complaint against Mariana Rarinca at NAD, because Rarinca was asking Livia Stanciu for a debt due to services rendered in the service of her deceased husband. Mariana Rarinca was preventively arrested for 6 months, in order to be subsequently declared innocent by a final decision of the court. As a result of the huge scandal, NAD, clearly acting as a political police instrument, opened an extraordinary way of attack, for Rarinca to be sentenced for a period equal to the one already executed during the time of her preventive custody for the obvious purpose of saving the image of the Chairwoman of the High Court of Cassation and Justice Livia Stanciu. NAD's challenging of a definitive ruling is unprecedented, obviously being used to cover the abuse of the Supreme Court chairwoman at that date.

- o) Livia Stanciu was also involved in the controversial case file of the current Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Liviu Dragnea, who led the panel that sentenced him to first court in a qualified corruption case file. She did not motivate the conviction sentence after the pronouncement, nor did she sign it until she left the position of High Court of Cassation and Justice chairwoman/judge, a situation that was found to breach Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights.

- p) Livia Stanciu had also issued a final conviction, in her High Court of Cassation and Justice judge mandate, against Mircia Gutau, acting mayor of Ramnicu Valcea, although all lower courts had issued acquittal resolutions. Following the execution of the 4-year sentence with execution, Mircia Gutau won the lawsuit against the Romanian state at the European Court of Human Rights and, at the trial, was acquitted by the Supreme Court;

- r) for her "merits", Livia Stanciu was nominated as Constitutional Court judge by President Klaus Iohannis, after the High Court of Cassation and Justice, under the leadership of Livia Stanciu, had given a favourable resolution to Klaus Iohannis, during the electoral campaign for the presidency of Romania in 2014, when he was accused by a state institution integrated into the anti-corruption system, the National Integrity Agency (ANI). In other similar cases, other mayors (ANI accusations were formulated for the mayoral mandate of Mr. Klaus Iohannis in Sibiu) received contrary resolutions.

- s) the situation in which the General Prosecutor Augustin Lazar, who is currently in the process of being revoked for extremely serious crimes, issued a notice, at the public request of the President of Romania, against the Romanian Gendarmerie commanders who defended the law on August 10th, 2018, against some violent actions, which explicitly aimed at the occupation of the Romanian Government headquarters. The Commanders of the Gendarmerie were indicted, inadvertently, as the Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice refused to investigate those who initiated and carried out the violence. The investigation was carried out by detachment of a prosecutor of the Military Prosecutor's Office, in violation of a General Prosecutor Order: after the violation of the Order, the Prosecutor General revoked the respective Order. By triggering the investigation, as in the case of the removal of the entire command structure of the secret service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the whole command structure of the Gendarmerie was removed from office.

Four months after their indictment, without any prior investigation (in rem), the investigation was basically blocked, the purpose of opening the case file being reached, according to the same modus operandi described above.

- s) the countless situations in which the Superior Council Of Magistracy blocked the disciplinary investigation of the former NAD prosecutor Laura Codruta Kovesi, one of which was done by censoring the Judicial Inspection Intimation Act by the Superior Council Of Magistracy. The Judicial Inspectorate challenged the decision of the Superior Council of Magistracy in court, and the court subsequently ordered by final ruling the obligation to restore the Intimation Act by introducing the passages removed by the Superior Council of Magistracy in order to pronounce a favourable solution for the chief prosecutor NAD.

- (t) the opening of untimely and manufactured criminal lawsuits against NAD prosecutors who have refused political orders and disclosed NAD's political police actions from within, for the purpose to remove them from the NAD and the magistracy. Subsequently, they won in court, being reinstated, and the abusive actions of the former NAD head and the obedient prosecutors were proved by final court rulings: for example, the case of NAD prosecutor, Mihaela Iorga. In the same context, after publishing a recording by means of which the NAD head requested to prosecute some ministers and a former prime minister from the subordinate prosecutors, she moved on to internal repression to identify the prosecutors who had made and given the recordings to the press, requesting the subjecting of all NAD prosecutors to the polygraph test. The method, comparable to those of the Gestapo and the Nazi SS or the Soviet KGB, was declared by the Superior Council of Magistracy to be abusive, without the NAD head being found liable. Prosecutors who refused the polygraph test were removed from the NAD with the complicity of the Superior Council of Magistracy (Mihaela Iorga was also charged with criminal charges, as shown above).

- t) the situation of the former deputy Sebastian Ghita, who filed a criminal complaint against the former head of the NAD, at that time general prosecutor of Romania, for taking bribes in connection with bringing a person in extradition proceedings in 2009 (Nicolae Popa). He included in the criminal complaint that he would have been required to pay from private funds the plane to bring the extradited person to the country, the Chief Prosecutor having the personal interest to be appointed as Chief Prosecutor NAD, if the extradition was made as soon as possible, considering that the transport with a line jet would have jeopardized the extradition that seemed to pose legality problems. In a first phase, the case was closed, with the support of some Ministry of Internal Affairs workers, who issued an address that the plane would have been paid by the institution. Recently, the file was reopened following the criminal complaint of the same former deputy, according to which a NAD prosecutor had stolen the receipt for payment by a private firm from the private firm’s accounts, in order to clear the traces. The investigation is ongoing at the Criminal Investigation of Magistrates Section. Former deputy Ghita made fulminant disclosures about the political police system in Romania, being part of this system for a brief period. In order to be removed, criminal case files were also produced against him. He fled from the country to scape retaliation, and he was the subject of an extradition case file from Serbia, the court in Serbia refusing to extradite him, ruling that there were abuses done by Romanian institutions. The former deputy is still in Serbia, under the protection of the Serbian authorities.

u) the status of the Secret Protocols. As we have shown above, they were denounced immediately after the disclosure by the signatory institutions: Romanian Information Service (SRI), the Public Ministry, the High Court of Cassation and Justice, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the institutional proof of their illegality. This situation, confirmed by the publication of the Protocols and the official positions of the institutions involved in the judiciary system, was qualified by the perpetrator in the CVM of 13.11. 2018 as "allegations," as we have shown above, refusing in this manner to take note of a reality that reflects the police state at system level of the state policy. By means of the act of omission, the perpetrators proved complicity with the political police system, by misappropriating the legal purpose of the CVM to support the implementation of the rule of law. By this act, the perpetrator violated the decision to establish the CVM directly, the official objectives of the CVM, thus violating the service attributions by committing offenses.

- v) after mass media disclosures and overwhelming evidence of the existence of a system of political police and a modus operandi of NAD in particular, but also at the level of the courts of law and of the Romanian Information Service (SRI), as well as through debates on legal changes of the texts regulating the magistrates' liability or the departure of the former SRI leadership from the system, there were hundreds of acquittals in the NAD case files ordered by the courts. The acquittals of hundreds of people investigated, convicted indefinitely and/or preventively arrested are public and created a state of shock throughout the Romanian society. These acquittal decisions were, again, not relevant in the CVM, in relation to the state of justice system in Romania, although the evidence is unquestionable.

- w) on November 7, 2018, the Romanian Constitutional Court disposed a Decision establishing a constitutional conflict between the Parliament and the High Court of Cassation and Justice, declaring that the Supplement of 5 Judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice had been unlawful since 2014. In these supplements, unassigned judges had been nominated, without any randomised process being employed, which has created the possibility that some judges suspected of underground connections with secret services and the political police system, may have systematically entered into politically difficult cases, to pronounce politically ordered decisions. The judgments pronounced by these courts will be re-judged. The unlawful practice is attributed to the same interest groups that have controlled justice: the High Court of Cassation and Justice's '5 judges' supplement, declared illegal by the Romanian Constitutional Court; these have been called by the justice representatives as being "death squads" and have judged the so-called large corruption cases of politicians and high rank dignitaries. This practice was possible in the context of the application of the CVM in Romania, and the perpetrators systematically praised the "fight against justice", in the conditions in which such horrors were happening in the justice field, that were only possible in the dictatorships of the 20-30s in Europe or in Bolshevik Russia.

The perpetrators, the European commissioners, who are paid from the money of European citizens, have transformed the CVM, in our opinion, into an "instrument of death", at the service of the police state.

1.4. The situations listed above cannot be treated as "unique" or "exceptions", being political police actions, established at state level, in a systematic and generalized manner.

The actions of abuse that the CVM treats as "allegations", opinions, are in fact legal realities proven by state institutions (court decisions or other official documents) that have ruled on the existence of abuses. The situations listed above, which are only by way of example, relate to each other: the same institutions involved, at the level of the same representatives of the repressive institutions, with the sole command in a para-state action, with the ultimate goal of controlling the Government and the Parliament and the entire Romanian society.

1.5. The perpetrators used the CVM, dissimulating the support and defence of the political police under the pretext of defending the fight against corruption, and generated a strong conflict with the institutions that rose to safeguard democracy and the rule of law. The responses of the Government, the Superior Council of Magistracy, the Ministry of Justice, the Constitutional Court and the Parliament to reject the CVM took an institutional form. The CVM Report chose to attack all these institutions with constitutional and popular legitimacy, under the protection of the European Commissioners, accomplices of the police state.

1.6. It is not possible to conceive the fight against corruption by denying the principles of law and the Constitution, outside the rule of law. The acts listed under item 1.3 of this Chapter, understood in their entirety, create an image that surpasses the Italian Mafia in the 1980s and 1990s in Italy, in terms of danger.

In Italy, there was a penetration of the state institutions by the criminal organization, and in the case of Romania, it is a quasi-total confiscation of the state institutions in a para-state form, regulated para-state by the secret protocols and established with the support of the CVM. A fight against corruption, which is corrupt in turn and politicized, cannot be accepted. The perpetrators, through the CVM, wanted to impose the model of the dictatorial state. The act of dissimulation to justify abuses in the name of an anti-corruption fight outside of the democratic framework is an application of the "state rationale" doctrine, according to which the general interest is above the interest of individuals and on its behalf, the rights and freedoms of individuals can be eliminated. The doctrine of "state rationale" is the foundation of dictatorial states, as opposed to the doctrine of the "rule of law", according to which the foundation of the state are the individual rights and freedoms, constitutionally guaranteed, the state being established and limited in its powers by the rule of law whose subject becomes the state, as well as any individual.

1.6. The situations contained in this Chapter represent a danger to national security.

* * *

VI. CVM QUALIFIES THE „CRITICISM” MADE BY THE MASS MEDIA RELATED TO THE JUSTICE ABUSE AS A „CLEAR RISK FOR THE TRUST OF THE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM”, CHALLENGING IN THIS MANNER THE RIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY

1. Freedom of speech and the development of independent media were the greatest gains of the Romanian society after 1989, symbolizing the exit from the closed and concentrated system of communism. Mass media has become the most important factor in the process of democratizing the country and reforming the political class.

2. The media has played an essential role in the fight against corruption, being the main actor in revealing most cases of corruption, which later appeared on at the magistrates' table. Long before NAD was founded, the media was the main "guardian of democracy" and of public funds in Romania, a fact which cannot be challenged. The same media massively reflected NAD's activity in the first period of its operation, even excessively, in violation of the presumption of innocence. There would have been no "fight against corruption" without the decisive contribution of the media, with major public opinion implications.

3. From the time of public disclosure of information on systemic abuse of justice and the politicization of the fight against corruption, independent media has been the main factor in uncovering these abuses. Hundreds of thousands of journalistic investigations have revealed undoubtable evidence related to case file evidence forged by prosecutors, threats and blackmailing of witnesses, issuers of criminal complaints, their families, the links of magistrates with the criminal world, secret services or politicians, abusive mafia-style practices in the world of justice. The disclosures reflected a problem of the whole system of justice, shocking the entire Romanian opinion. The media has constantly taken on the same activity, in what concerns political life.

4. What created confusion, followed by a real fury of the public opinion, was that the judiciary system, by means of the heads of these institutions, knew the abuses and had been part of them, and, after the disclosure, blocked the accountability procedures related to the guilty magistrates, creating a defence wall around them. The judiciary system proved itself corrupt, the prosecutors and the judges, who destroyed, with fabricated case files, thousands of lives and pulverised a large part of the political class at political command or institutions, being covered with the impunity of the same political police system. For a very long time, mass media disclosures have faced NAD's refusal and other institutions refusal to respond and start investigations. Inevitably, an open conflict has emerged, as the independent media refused to give up.

5. Acts of retaliation followed, with the harassment of journalists, under the threat of opening of criminal case files, the main public debate press trust being unjustifiably criminally investigated, a publicly-known situation.

6. After a real and long war that engaged the entire Romanian society, revealing extreme abuses of prosecutors, judges, senior intelligence officers, politicians and businessmen, in the face of public reaction, the repressive institutions had to take steps back. Parliament responded to the investigation commission's disclosures. Secret Protocols have been discovered within these Committees, and unchallenged evidence has been made public regarding political police actions.

At the same time, against the refusal of the institutions to react, the Parliament and the Government opened proceedings before the Constitutional Court, which, for the most part, related to abuses.

7. Basically, the main factor in the destructuring of the political police was the media, which engaged, through the fulminant disclosures, for the entire Romanian society to see, the political police system comparable to the Italian mafia or the dictatorial regimes in Europe in the 20s and the KGB-controlled Soviet Union.

8. In the first period, the media unconditionally and even excessively supported the fight against corruption, after the disclosures, the media also discovered that it was being manipulated. In this first period, the media was praised by the CVM. After the disclosures, however, it has become a target for the CVM, alongside the Government, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Superior Council of Magistracy, its purpose to support and defend the police state being obvious.

9. In the Report from 13.11.2018, the perpetrators carry out an unacceptable attack against the independent mass media, in a field which has no connection to the CVM, the freedom of press, for the purpose of instating censorship, breaching article 30 (2) of the Constitutions: “Censorship of any kind is prohibited”. The Report contains severe statements against the independent press. Under page 2, the Report states: “The January 2017 Report noted that there were societal, legal and political factors which, although not within the scope of the CVM and not covered by its recommendations, "have a direct bearing on the ability to deliver reform and in particular have MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT for Romania to show that reform has taken root on a permanent basis". Points noted included a legislative practice still to develop better regulation principles, confrontation between state actors, and A DIFFICULT MEDIA ENVIRONMENT.” Below this, also on page 2, the idea is continued: “NONE of these factors (including the media – our note) HAS SEEN AN IMPROVEMENT since the January 2017 Report. Major legislative changes have been rushed through using urgency procedures with minimal consultation. Judges and prosecutors have continued to face PERSONAL ATTACKS IN THE MEDIA, WITH MECHANISMS FOR REDRESS FALLING SHORT.” The Report comes back to the subject of mass media at page 7, sub-chapter Conduct Codes, carrying out a severe attack, incompatible with democracy and freedom of speech, using against it the concept of “risk”, a term exclusively meant for the field of national security: “Since the last CVM Report, criticism of the judicial system and magistrates in the MEDIA (…) has continued. Throughout 2018, there was regular criticism targeting the judiciary as a whole, in particular the institutions dealing with high-level corruption, as well as individual magistrates. This ENTAILS A CLEAR RISK TO PUBLIC TRUST in the judiciary”.

The CVM Report also condemns, in numerous occasions, the Superior Council of Magistracy, as it was not capable „to protect its reputation, independence and impartiality of its magistrates”, clearly referring to the so-called „criticism” from the mass media. Thus, under page 12 of the Report, the following is mentioned: „The Council WAS NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE A STRONG STANCE IN THIS AREA (protection of the magistrates’ reputation – our note), despite the OVERALL SITUATION IN TERMS OF PUBLIC CRITICISM of the magistracy and judicial institutions.”

9.1. The aforementioned statements in the Report have targeted the media, qualified as a "risk" to the public's trust, the term "risk" being used in national security and terrorism related registers, which is unacceptable. In fact, the CVM reveals its desperation in relation to the disclosure of abuses, with the media being permanently associated with the Parliamentarians' initiatives. The CVM puts the issue in a threatening way, talking about the media as "a factor that has burdened Romania's task to prove that the reform has taken perennial roots," emphasizing that "repair mechanisms" against criticism are not "effective".

9.2. 9.2. The Report, however, makes no appraisal, whether this "criticism" in the media is real or not. The fact that it does not evaluate this in any way is proof that it has no arguments, and the criticisms are well founded. In fact, the CVM could not even claim that the criticisms are unrealistic; most of the disclosures have been confirmed as real by court decisions, documents of criminal prosecution bodies, decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court, realities that cannot be challenged, such as the illegal secret protocols, etc. In this context, the observations in the Report are abusive, having the direct significance of pressure and intimidation of the independent media. Due to the fact that the perpetrators have no media assessment included in their job duties, they have committed the crime of abuse of office in relation to this aspect as well.

9.3. At the same time, the Report contains a very serious assessment, namely that the lack of "public trust" is a "risk" to the justice system. In a rule of law, justice is done "in the name of the law", which is a fundamental principle of the rule of law. Justice in the interest of "public trust" - in dictatorial terms (communist or fascist regimes) "on behalf of the people" - is not related to the enforcement of justice in the rule of law. "Public trust" is not part of the legal safeguards for the independence of the judiciary. In a democratic state, "trust" is obtained through fair justice, administered under democratic laws, a justice accepted by citizens as impartial and fair, for the benefit of society. Yet, the perpetrators, in the same rhetoric of supporting and defending the police state, believe that "public trust" is even a constituent factor in the accomplishment of the act of justice, in dictatorial tradition. These assertions are incompatible with the functions of Commissioners of the European Union, the perpetrators seriously breaching their service duties, based on the competences prescribed by the Treaty of the Union, introducing practices, which, in essence, are totalitarian, in the field of justice. The presence of such persons at the leadership of EU institutions is a major danger to the Member States, as well as to the Union.

9.4. The Report does not refer to a reality that represents a real danger to the rule of law: the presence in the media of the Romanian Intelligence Service's undercover officers or agents of influence of this service, which has broadened its competences in all areas of the Romanian society, according to the old Security (Securitate) model. The existence of these undercover officers of the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), a highly controversial body following recent disclosures, has distorted the entire public debate. The most important independent opinion vectors in civil society have publicly qualified the media trusts co-ordinated by secret services as "Military Press Units". These trusts, with sources of suspicious financing or indebted for non-payment of taxes and fees due to the state worth tens of millions of euros - hence blackmail-susceptible - are those that systematically support and defend the police state abuses openly.

Such an interference of secret services, which seriously affects freedom of expression in a democratic society, massively manipulating public opinion, is a vital issue for the existence of the rule of law based on transparency and truth. The CVM also refuses to take action, in a complicit manner, about these trusts, in what concerns undercover officers and secret service involvement in manipulating public opinion - those that support the police state. This new omission is also a violation of the duty of the perpetrators.

9.5. The CVM attack on the independent media represents an attack on public opinion, in general, in order to not properly inform the people and/or misinform them. Based on the abovementioned, the independent media is added to the explicit targets of the CVM: the Parliament, the Government, the Constitutional Court, the Superior Council of Magistracy, in the effort to support and defend the police state.

* * *

VII. INFORMATIVE NOTE FROM 04.12.2018 OF THE PERPETRATOR ANGELA CRISTEA, HEAD OF THE EC REPREESENTATIVE IN ROMANIA, ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER; PROOF OF INVOLVEMENT OF PARTISAN POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND DISINFORMATION OF THE COMMISSION BY THE ORGANISED GROUP RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CVM REPORT

On December 4th, 2018, an informative note authored by the perpetrator Angela Cristea was sent to the EC President, Jean-Claude Juncker, under the title "The talented Mr Dragnea". The note has a purely political and denigrating content related to the President of the Chamber of Deputies and PSD president, Liviu Dragnea, resembling the informative notes of the Security (Securitate) during the communist regime of Nicolae Ceausescu.

The note is a demonization of the President of the Chamber of Deputies and proof that he has become the target of the organized group described in the present document, with the aim of compromising him externally. In fact, the Note represents an attack on Parliament, for the legislative amendments in the field of justice, which are aimed at eliminating the political police in Romania, the abuses committed by breaking the constitutional order and the rule of law.

The note flagrantly violates the powers of the EC representative in Bucharest, Angela Cristea, violating and surpassing the Commission's powers vis-à-vis the Member States, which are governed by the Treaty of the Union. The content of the Note, exclusively political, based on false information, in order to compromise the President of the Chamber of Deputies, in violation of the legal duties of the service, represents, in our opinion, the constitutive elements of crimes such as abuse of service, intellectual misrepresentation and the communication of false information carried out by the perpetrators.

As the Head of the European Commission Representation in Bucharest, she is directly liable for the content of the CVM Report of 13.11.2018 and will be investigated and will be liable for the official Commission document described in this Criminal Complaint.

We kindly ask you to press charges against the perpetrators and send them before a court of law for the offenses described above.

* Read here the Romanian version of the article